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Problem.-The basic problem is the desire of the developing
countries to have an access to the modern technology of the
developed countries which will speed their economic development
and thereby help to bridge the economic gap between the deve
loped and less developed countries.
Purpose.-An attempt is made by the writer to critically
examine and assess the proposal on the transfer of technology
from developed to less developed countries, in order to see
whether such transfer will bring about economic development to
the less developed countries.
Result.-The result obtained from this study is that tech
nological progress is a necessary condition for economic deve
lopment and its transfer from developed to less developed coun
tries must be encouraged. However, the technological infrastruc
ture is weak or non-existent in developing countries. Tech
nology transfer will bring about a meaningful change if the
technological infrastructures in less developed countries are
strengthened to absorb the new technology and evolve new ones.
Procedure.-The main sources of information were the United
Nations Documents on Transfer of Technology. Numerous books,
journals and periodicals were also used as references.
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--Developed Countries, Synonymous with North.
--European Economic Community.
--Encompasses some developed market economy
countries representing the North in the
"North-South Dialogue" on specific issues
of the world economy such as raw materials,
financing, etc. These countries are:
Australia, Canada, EEC (as one unit), Japan,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
States.
--The term was used by the U. N. to describe
countries considered as MSA (Most Seriously
Affected) by recent adverse economic condi
tions. Now, the term is being used inter
changeably for 120 or more non/semi indus




--Most Seriously Affected. The term was used
by the U. N. to describe countries considered
as most seriously affected by the recent eco
nomic situation. These countries are: Bang
ladesh, Central African Republic, Chad,
Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hon
duras, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Khmer Repub
lic, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauri
tania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, United Republic of
Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper
Volta and Yemen.
—New International Economic Order.
--Is a shortened form used for industrialized
countries. This includes about 30 high income
countries of North America, Europe and Japan
with an average GNP per capita of $4,500.
viii
. ix
OPEC --Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
South --Is a shortened form for 120 or more non/semi
industrial states of Africa, Asia and Latin
America. These countries have instituted
what is known as a "Southern Solidarity" and
have concertedly spoken against the present
international economic system which they con
tend discriminates against them.
TNCs --Transational Corporations.
UN --United Nations.
UNCTAD —United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop
ment.
These terms and abbreviations are currently being used by




The Developing Countries and the Prevailing
International Economic Order
The present international economic system is one of
extreme global inequality. The gap between the developed and
less developed countries as measured by almost all key econo
mic indicators, is extremely wide and continues to grow wider.
In 1976, over one hundred and twenty less developed countries
(with over seventy percent of world population) in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and South America recorded only twenty
percent of the global world product. In contrast, the de
veloped countries (with about twenty-eight percent of world
population) of Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, North
America and the Soviet Union recorded eighty percent of glo
bal world product. In 1977, the total exports of the de
veloped market economies totaled $729.9 billion, an estimated
sixty-four percent of the value of world exports. In the
same period, the .exports of the developing market economies
totaled $291.1 billion, representing twenty-six percent of
the value of world exports, OPEC accounted for over half of
these revenues--$147.8 billion. The external debt of the
■^Overseas Development Council, The United States and
World Development: Agenda 1979 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1979), p. 206.
less developed countries increased from $50 billion in 1972
to $173.9 billion at the end of 1975 while the debt service
payment is rapidly mounting. It increased from $9.1 billion
in 1974 to $11.3 billion in 1976.2
The magnitude and the extent of poverty is alarming
in the developing countries. It is estimated that some 770
million people in the less developed countries live in a state
of abject poverty. The ever widening economic gap between
the developed and less developed countries can also be traced
in terms of the levels of literacy and education, essential
services such as health care and the consumption of basic
foods, clothing and housing. Only marginal progress has been
made in these areas. The ever pressing problems of hunger,
unemployment and underemployment, poverty and urban degrada
tion are still present today at a time of rapid economic ex
pansion in the developed countries. Below are tables on (1)
Physical Quality of Life Index, (2) Illiteracy in Developing
Countries, (3) Daily Per Capita Grain, Meat and Milk Consump
tion in Selected Developed and Developing Countries, 1970 and
(4) Estimated Population Unemployed and Under-employed, in
Developing and Developed Countries, by Region, 1975. The
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) serves as a useful
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop
ment, Annual Report, 1977 (Washington, D. C: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1977), pp. 109-115.
20p. Cit., The United States and World Development:
Agenda 1979 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 150.
measure of a country's general progress toward more equitably
meeting basic human requirements for the majority of the popu
lation. A PQLI of 90 or above refers to developed countries
while a PQLI below 90 refers to developing countries. De
veloped countries rank high with a PQLI of 94 while less de
veloped countries rank low with a PQLI of 56. A break down
into regions show the intensity of poverty in less developed
countries. Africa is the lowest with a PQLI of 32, followed
by Asia with 57 and Latin America 71. Table 2 shows the
Illiteracy in Developing Countries by P>.egion and Sex, 1960 and
1970. In 1970, 143 million people in Africa, an estimated 74
percent of the entire population were illiterate. This is
followed by Asia with 579 million people or 47 percent of her
population that were illiterate. Latin America with 39 mil
lion people or 24 percent of her population has the lowest
illiteracy rate in the Third World. In Table 3, we see that
the caloric intake for 32 developed countries in 1970 was
3,079. On the other hand, 101 less developed countries had a
caloric intake of 2,239. In table 4, the magnitude of unem
ployment and under-employment is quite severe in LDCs. In
1975, about 45 percent of the labour force in Africa was
either unemployed or under-employed. This was followed by
Asia with 40.3 percent of the labour force unemployed or
under-employed, and Latin America with 34 percent of the
labour force unemployed or under-employed. This is a sharp
contrast with developed countries that had only 5.2 percent
of their labour force unemployed or under-employed during the
same period.
TABLE 1






































































•'■In 1976, world population was 4.0 billion; world GNP was $6.7
trillion.
2A11 averages are weighted by mid-1978 populations of the countries
included.
3Each country's Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is based on an
average of life expectancy at age one, infant mortality, and
literacy rates.
4Does not include South Africa and the OPEC countries of Algeria,
Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria.
Includes the People's Republic of China, but excludes Israel, Japan,
and the OPEC countries of Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar,
Saudia Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
^Excludes the OPEC countries of Ecuador and Venezuela,
'includes Eastern European countries and the U.S.S.R.
Israel and South Africa,
developed countries are those 28 countries (as shown on Table A-4)
with per capita GNPs of $2,000 or more and a PQLI of 90 or above;
and developing countries are all others.
Source: Overseas Development Council, The United States and World Develop
ment; Agenda 1979, p. 174. For further explanation, see pp. 145-
150.
TABLE 2
ILLITERACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY
REGION AND SEX, 1960 AND 1970
(millions and percentages)
1960 1970





























































■'"Does not include the People's Republic of China.
NOTES: The illiteracy rate is generally defined as that
proportion of the adult population 15 years or
older unable to read or write. Based on the
most recent data available for individual coun-
■ tries, it is estimated that in the late 1970s
there are some 760 million illiterate adults
in Asia (not including China), 330 million in
Africa, and 95 million in Latin America.
SOURCE: The Assault on World Poverty: Problems of Rural
Development, Education and Health. Published tor
the World Bank (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univer-
siry Press, 1975), p. 295. Based on UNESCO
data. (Reproduced by Overseas Development
Council, The United States and World Development
Agenda 1979, p. 180!
TABLE 3
DAILY PER CAPITA GRAIN, MEAT. AND MILK CONSUMPTION IN






























































































































































































aCalories not dervied from grain, meat, and milk are derived from potatoes, sugar and sweets, pulses.
.nuts and seeds and fats and oils.
bAverage for 32 developed countries, based on the most recent data available
^Average for 101 developing countries, based on the most recent data available.
SOURC AVTaiedfon Ste^Sons.^r^?^"ioSSTfSir. , Statistical Office, 5^-1
^eaXok 1972, U.N. Publication Sales No. E/F. 73. XVII, 1. Table 162 pp. 524-30. (Reproduced by Overseas Development
Council; The United States and World Development. Agenda for Action 1976. p. 142.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED POPULATION UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYED





































































































aAustralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
.Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia.
Of this number, 8.1 million unemployed are in North America (the
United States and Canada); this represents about 8.1 percent of their
combined labor force.
NOTES: Centrally planned economies are not included in this table. The
unemployed are defined as those "persons without a job and looking for
work;" the underemployed are defined as those "persons who are in em
ployment of less than normal duration and who are seeking or would
accept additional work" as well as those "with a job yielding inade
quate income."
SOURCE: Overseas Development Council, The United States and World Develop
ment: Agenda 1977, p. 178.
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The fact that the Third World countries did not share
adequately in the prosperity of the advanced countries at a
time of rapid economic expansion in these countries, could be
traced to some basic weakness in the mechanism that links the
international economic system. This basic weakness which
takes the form of economic dependence, with its evils of unem
ployment, hunger and poverty in the developing countries at a
time of rising GNP in the developed countries dampened the
faith of the developing countries in the international econo
mic transactions, and leads them to intensify their critique
of the developed countries and the existing international eco
nomic system.
The Call for a Hew International Economic Order
The proposal for a "New International Economic Order"
reflect changes of an unprecedented magnitude among LDCs—
changes in the purposes, mechanisms and structures of the
existing international economic system. These changes were
designed to make the international economic system more re
sponsive to their needs. The 1960s-saw many developing coun
tries gain their independence from colonial domination. Most
of these newly independent states became members of the United
Nations and other world bodies, However, political indepen
dence did not bring about economic independence for the de
veloping countries which are still heavily dependent upon the
developed countries for the export of their raw materials,
import of manufactured goods, financing and technology.
The "Group of 77" came into being within the frame
work of UNCTAD 1 in 1964. This group has emerged as a co
hesive block in international forums with some success in
drawing world attention to their economic problems. Since its
formation, the group has campaigned relentlessly for a "new
order," both within the United Nations system and other in
ternational organizations. However, it was in 1974 that the
"group of 77", which now comprises one hundred and twenty or
more states of the south, launched an official campaign for a
new international economic order. The official call for a
NIEO is manifested in four United Nations resolutions passed
since May 1974.
(i) The "Declaration on the Establishment of
a New International Economic Order",
adopted May 16, 1974.
(ii) The "Programme of Action on the Establish
ment of a New International Economic Order",
adopted May 16, 1974.
(iii) The "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States", adopted December 12, 1974.
(iv) Resolution on "Development and International
Economic Co-Operation", adopted September 16,
1975.
These resolutions as earlier ones probably would never have
received much attention, but for OPEC's dramatic action in
1973--the quadrupling of the price on its crude oil and the
subsequent embargo on the United States and other developed
countries not supportive of the Arab cause in the Arab-
U. N. General Assemply, Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and
3202 (S-VII), May 1, 1974, and Resolutions 3281 (XXIX)
December 12, 1974, and Resolutions 3262 (S-VIII), Septem
ber 16, 1975.
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Israeli dispute. As a result, President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing of France initiated a conference between the north
and south in October 1974, by inviting OPEC and non-OPEC mem
bers of the south, and the developed countries to discuss the
energy problem. A meeting was called for April 1975 to pre
pare an agenda for the energy producer-consumer talks. The
meeting was unable to reach a consensus as OPEC, supported by
non-OPEC developing countries, refused to attend the proposed
talks unless the energy problems were linked with raw mate
rials and other development issues of importance to the de
veloping countries. The north led by the United States re
fused to accede to such demands by the south. Then, follow
ing the demise of the agenda meeting of the energy producer-
consumer talks, and the United States' insistence against tak
ing part in any discussions having to do with the restructur
ing of the present international economic system, the then
U.S. Secretary of State, Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, an
nounced on May 13th, 1975 at the Kansas City International
Relations Council, a change in the U.S. position taken at
the agenda meeting in France. Dr. Kissinger said that, "the
United States was prepared to engage in a constructive dia
logue and to work co-operatively on the great economic issues"
of mutual concern.
5Address by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Former
U.S. Secretary of State, before the Kansas City International
Relations Council, Missouri, May 13, 1975. Reproduced in
Issues at the Special Session of the 1975 U.N. General
Assembly, p. 241.
11
At the seventh special session of the U.N. in Sep
tember 1975, the U.S. unveiled its new policy of co-opera
tion between the north and south. The new policy included
several proposals to aid the developing countries by improv
ing the existing international economic system. This mani
fested the U.S. and southern states' desire to improve what .
was already a deteriorated north-south relationship.
The call for a NIEO by the south is alleged to be a
comprehensive drive to rectify the present imbalance that
exists among states in the present international economic
order. It aims at redistributing the economic resources of
the world and the bringing about of equity in the interna
tional economic system. It is hoped that this will abolish
third world poverty, dependency and other economic injus
tices which are prevalent under the existing order. There
fore, the less developed countries offer eight major proposals
to correct the inequities in the present international eco
nomic system. These eight major proposals are contained in
the "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New In
ternational Economic Order" and other documents previously
mentioned. This paper, however, will address itself to only
one of these proposals—proposal on the "transfer of tech
nology."
Catherine B. Gwin, "The Seventh Special Session:
Towards New Phase of Relations Between the Developed and the
Developing Countries?" in The New International Economic
Order: Confrontation or Co-operation between North and South,
ed, Karl P. Sauvant (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 108.
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Purpose of this Thesis
The NIEO proposal on the "transfer of technology" has
attracted consierable attention in scholarly writings and
debates.7 Some scholars argue that a true transfer is the
best way to bridge the technological gap between the developed
and less developed countries. They argue that developing
countries have not been given much access to the modern tech
nology of the developed countries mainly because of restric
tive business practices of transnational corporations. As a
result, less developed countries have not been able to create
the technological capacity that will enable them to solve
many of their development problems. Some scholars, particu
larly in the developed countries, argue that intermediate
technology is the solution to the development problems of the
third world. Other arguments concerning technology transfer,
especially from scholars in the developing countries are
basically ideological polemics.
However, the writer is of the opinion that serious
attention has not been given to the overall merit or
7L. Adamovic, "Transfer of Technology and the New
International Economic Order," Review °f,^nt^rnatio°al ,.
Affairs, vol. xxix (December 5, 1978):»-1Z; Renato Constan
tino, "Global Enterprises and the Transfer of Technology,
The Journal nf Contemporary Asia, vol. 7, no. 1 (1977) :4-4-
AS • v. V. Schumacher. Small is Beautiful: Economics as a.f
People Mattered (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973),
pp 171-190; H. W. Singer, International Development: Growth
and Change (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, iyb4), PP-
58-61; and J. S. Singh, A New International Economic Order:
Toward a Fair Redistribution" of the World's Resources (New
York: Praeger Publisher, iy/7), pp. /y-84.
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substantive assessment of technology transfer. While tech
nological progress is a necessary condition for economic
development and its transfer from developed to less developed
countries must be encouraged; the absence or weakness of tech
nological infrastructure in less developed countries must be
addressed for the transfer to be successful. Therefore, the
purpose of this thesis is to critically examine and assess
the proposal on the transfer of technology from developed to
less developed countries. In the course of this analysis,
the question of whether the developed countries have the tech
nology that is appropriate for the socio-economic development
of less developed countries will be examined. The study will
also examine some aspects of the code of conduct for the
transfer of technology. Finally, the writer will offer some
policy recommendations that are important for the transfer
of technology to have a positive effect on the economies of
less developed countries.
Rationale
The NIEO proposal on "transfer of technology" is
timely because of some fundamental changes in the world sys
tem: The fact that most Third World countries are no longer
colonies of the developed countries. These countries are now
attempting to chart an independent course towards economic
development. The instability of the international monetary
system. The rising price of oil due to the formation of OPEC.
Finally, the deteriorating terms of trade for Third World
14
countries. Because of these changes, the advanced countries
are now faced with interrupted flow of raw materials at un
stable prices. The free operation of trans-national corpora
tions in the Third World is now being challenged.
Transfer of technology in terms of the needs of the
Third World could bring about meaningful changes in the exist
ing structures of the international economic system. Such
changes could avoid tensions in the Third World which is an
important element in global peace and security. What prob
lems will LDCs encounter in the transfer of technology from
DCs, and what are the conditions under which transfer of tech
nology will be beneficial to LDCs—these are some of the is
sues that will be considered in this study.
The NIEO Proposal on the Transfer of Technology
The NIEO proposal on the "transfer of technology"
states that:
All efforts should made:
(a) To formulate an international code of conduct
for the transfer of technology corresponding
to needs and conditions prevalent in develop
ing countries;
(b) To give access on improved terms to modern
technology and to adapt that technology, as
appropriate, to specific economic, social and
ecological conditions and varying stages of
development in developing countries;
(c) To expand significantly the assistance from
developed to developing countries in research
and development programmes and in the creation
of suitable indigenous technology;
(d) To adapt commercial practices governing trans
fer of technology to the requirements of the
15
developing countries and to prevent abuse of
the rights of sellers;
(e) To promote international co-operation in
research and development in exploration and
exploitation, conservation and the legitimate
utilization of natural resources and all
sources of energy;
In taking the above measures, the special needs of the
least developed and land-locked countries should be borne in
mind.
Technology transfer is the transfer or exchange from
developed to developing countries of the elements of technical
know-how which are normally required in setting up and operat
ing new production facilities which are normally in very short
o
supply in less developed countries. The concept of technology
transfer may also include the circulation of know-how used to
conduct feasibility studies or other management services. It
is regarded as an essential factor in the development of in
dustries and an important stimulus to economic growth and
development. Technology is generally the property of indivi
duals or businesses— notably trans-national corporations and
can be transferred by means of direct foreign investment,
through patents or licenses, equipment importation and servic
ing and consultant services. Such vehicles for transfer pre
supposes the willingness of the owner to offer terms that the
o
U.N. General Assembly, Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (3202.
S-VI), May 1, 1974, p. 115.
Q
Denis Goulet, The Uncertain Promise: Value Conflicts
in Technology Transfer (New York: I.O.D.C., 1977), p. 6.
16
potential buyer likes and can afford.
Traditional patterns of technology transfer have been
in the form of direct foreign investment. This investment
generally comes as a package together with management and mar
keting services. The foreign subsidiary takes up residence
in any of the LDCs and ensures the availability of techniques
thought best suited for the development plans of the nation.
However, less developed countries have been concerned over the
total cost of such investment, i.e., the flow of profits and
dividends plus fees, royalties and other remittances to parent
companies. There is also a growing feeling in these countries
that ownership and control should rest with nationals. Third
World countries are now looking for better alternatives to
transfer technology. Another pattern of technology transfer is
by an outright purchase. Japan exemplifies a nation whose in
dustrial growth has been based primarily on purchase of Ameri
can and European technology. At an early stage, Japan was
able to appropriate most of these technologies and develop her
own technology. A third method of transfer is to give tech
nology away free of charge. It is very unrealistic to expect
owners of technology to give away this costly commodity without
any recompense. Many of the developing countries, however,
have urged the adoption of this method of transfer in order for
them to become technologically self-sufficient. They also argue
Jose DeCubas, Technology Transfer and the Developing
Nations (New York: Multinational Management Education, 1974),
P- 4.
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that the technology which they need is in the developed coun
tries , and the developed countries owe them a moral debt which
can be achieved in part by free technology transfer. *■*■ In the
next chapter, we shall examine the question of an appropriate
technology for less developed countries.
UIbid. , p. 5.
CHAPTER 2
THE QUESTION OF AN APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
FOR LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Developed Countries Technology Versus
Less Developed Countries Needs
In the preceding chapter, an attempt was made to ana
lyze one of the crucial problems of the prevailing interna
tional economic system and its effect on less developed coun
tries. Since less developed countries lack the technological
know-how, they become dependent on developed countries for the
export of primary products and the import of manufactured
goods causing their economic development to be contingent on
conditions in the developed countries. In order to solve this
problem, the NIEO strategist propose that technology transfer
from the developed to less developed countries be arranged and
implemented.
The NIEO proposal on technology transfer states that
such transfer must take into consideration the social and eco
nomic conditions in less developed countries. This raises
some basic questions such as the following: Will the tech
nology in developed countries solve the economic problems in
less developed countries? If not, then what is an appropriate
technology for less developed countries?
18
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Generally, technology transfer to less developed coun
tries has been in the form of direct foreign investment. While
the application of transferred technology has brought some pro
gress in accelerating the growth of output, improving material
standards of life and spreading modernization, less developed
countries still find themselves unable to meet the basic needs
of the majority of their population. At the onset of the
"Development Decade" in 1960, the U.N. estimated that 27 percent
of the labour force in less developed countries was unemployed.
12
By the end of 1960, unemployment had risen to 30 percent.
This raises the crucial question as to whether developed coun
tries have the technology that can be effectively used in solv
ing the problems of less developed countries.
The technologies in developed countries are for the
most part capital intensive. These technologies presuppose an
abundance of capital, shortage of labour and corresponding high
wage rates. The application of such technologies require high
levels of training and skills which are available in developed
countries.
However, the factor endowment in less developed coun
tries is defined by shortage of capital, skills and a relative
abundance of labour. The transfer of this type of technology
which "is both deliberately and innately determined by the re-
13
quirements and factor endowment of industrialized countries,"
12r. Barnet and R. E. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of
the Multinational Corporation (New York: Simon and Schuster
Publishers, 1974), p. 166.
■^Singer, International Development: Growth and Change,
p. 59. & —
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will not solve the development needs of less developed coun
tries. The basic problem in less developed countries is pov
erty and its various manifestations. The shortage of produc
tive employment possibilities is one of the most serious and
immediate causes of poverty. Unemployment especially in the
rural areas causes a large percent of the rural population to
migrate to cities in search of employment. However, employ
ment in the cities is often non-existent and the problem is
excerbated by tremendous housing shortage. There is dire need
for housing in less developed countries. In addition, less
developed countries are large importers of food. This sug
gests that agricultural technology is needed in these countries
to help alleviate hunger and suffering. LDCs are still pre
dominantly agrarian societies whose farming population is not
equipped with or educated to handle modern farming technology
well. As a result, small scale farming still prevails. Since
emphasis on capital intensive technology in LDCs has failed to
solve the development problems, the case could be made for
another type of technology. Singer notes that for LDCs, "a
different technology, and in many ways an older or inferior
14
one," would be more appropriate.
The question of an appropriate technology in the
social context has been widely discussed with regard to the
economic situation in less developed countries. The term
14Ibid., p. 59.
15Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if
People Mattered, pp. 171-190; and H. W. Singer, Technologies
for Basic Needs' (Geneva: International Labour Office" 1977) .
21
"Appropriate Technology" has been used to describe intermediate
technology. But development scholars in LDCs have equated in
termediate technology with older or inferior technology. Pres
ently, "there are no widely accepted definitions of what con
stitute an appropriate, low cost or intermediate technology.1
Rather than try to give a debatable definition, the writer will
give two concrete examples to illustrate an intermediate tech
nology. The ox-plough, introduced in several tropical African
countries is a good example of an intermediate technology. It
is half way between the traditional hoe and diesel tractor.
Another example of intermediate technology is the gari machine
developed in Nigeria. Gari, a product of cassava is a staple
food in some parts of West Africa. It is between the tradi
tional manual preparation method and the modern large-scale
technology of preparing. LDCs argue that this technology is
inferior and unproductive and also keeps LDCs permanently in
technological backwardness. One of the major works which ad
dresses this point fully is the "Intermediate technology con-
18
cept" advanced by the late E. F. Sdhumacher. Schumacher
classifies the technology in LDCs as a i.1 - technology and that
in DCs as a £.1,000 - technology. The middle ground between the
two he calls a fclOO - technology or intermediate technology.
16Nicholas Jequier, ed. , Appropriate Technology: Prob
lems and Promises (Paris, OECD, 1976), p. 17.
17Ibid., p. 17.
18Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, pp. 171-190.
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He argues that the attempt of LDCs to infiltrate the 4.1000 -
technology into their fcl - technology economies has been detri
mental to their economic development. It kills off the LI -
technology at an alarming rate, destroying traditional work
places much faster than modern work places can be created, and
thereby leaving the poor in a more desperate and helpless
position than ever before.
Schumacher believes that intermediate technology is
appropriate for LDCs and lists four propositions that must be
considered in the development of intermediate technology. (1)
Workplaces must be provided in the rural areas where most of
the people are living and not in the urban cities where they
tend to migrate. (2) These workplaces must be on the average
cheap enough so that they can be created in large numbers with
a minimum amount of capital, i.e., capital that LDCs can afford.
(3) The production methods even though more complicated and
efficient than traditional technologies will be simple enough
to be operated by village labour. This will minimize the de
mand for high skills especially in the production processes.
(4) Production should be mainly from local materials. Inter
mediate technology, unlike capital-intensive technology which
uses scarce foreign exchange, destroys jobs and concentrate
wealth in a few hands; provides knowledge, training and machin
ery at a level and price that can be assimilated by the bulk of
the population. This technology emphasizes smallness, simpli
city, capital cheapness and peacefullness. Based on these
facts, the propositions and attributes of intermediate
23
technology are good and may be of some success in LDCs. How
ever, there are some questions that Schumacher leaves unan
swered. He does not say who is to provide this technology and
at what cost. He leaves unanswered the question of what the
precise level of labour and capital intensity would be embodied
in such technology. He seems to imply that this technology
will operate in a "closed economy" which is impossible at this
stage of global economic interdependence.
While it is questionable as to whether an efficient in
termediate technology now exist, there is no doubt, however,
that such a technology could be developed by TNCs for example
if its creation is justified on cost-benefit considerations.
Assuming that such technology is developed, a greater percent
of the population in LDCs would be employed because of its
labour-intensity. However, the benefits of increased employ
ment would be only in the short run. Intermediate technology
will not necessarily solve the unemployment problem in LDCs.
This is because increased employment can only be obtained with
increased productivity, which would lower cost and promote con
sumption and the ability to compete in world market. The total
cost of a particular industrial firm using an intermediate
technology might be lower than one using a capital intensive
technology, but because of lower productivity, the actual cost
per unit produced may be higher. As a result, these products
will not be competitive in the world market. Intermediate
technology cannot be applied uniformly in all sectors of the
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economy. The exploration and exploitation of certain mineral
resources such as oil call for very skilled labour and sophis
ticated technology. Intermediate technology rules out modern
factories for manufacturing things such as electrical appli
ances , automobiles and weapons which are in high demand world
wide. Intermediate technology, once developed by DCs will
19
still keep LDCs technologically dependent on DCs. Inter
mediate technology is not a panacea for the development prob
lems in LDCs. Although simpler than capital-intensive tech
nology, it still requires a certain degree of technological
infrastructure. This is why an effective technology policy
must be implemented within the context of national economic
planning. In the final analysis, it is the development and
strengthening of the technological infrastructure in LDCs
that will provide the means of absorbing the technology trans
ferred. This will guard against technological dependence and
lead further to the creation of indigenous technology. We
shall return to this question later on in the study. Apart
from the "appropriateness" of transferred technology to the
economic conditions in LDCs, the other principle technology
issue is cost.
19Andre'VanDam, "The Multinational Corp. Vis-a-Vis
Societies in Transformation: The Case for Intermediate Tech
nology in the Developing Countries," Technological Forecast
ing and Social Change, vol. 5 (1973), p. 282.
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Cost of Technology Transfer and Implication
for Economic Development
While the benefits to LDCs of technology transfer can
not be underestimated, the costs of such transfer must be taken
into account. Such costs provide an indirect means of assess
ing the importance of technology's contribution to socio-
economic development. Technology is definitely not a free com
modity. It is an expensive commodity and LDCs are justifiably
concerned over the price at which they are to pay for foreign
technology. They are concerned about the effects of such pur
chases on their countries' balance of payments, about the un
necessary expenditures because they are required to purchase
"packages" in order to get the technology they want.
Table 5 shows the foreign exchange costs of transfer
of technology in comparison with other relevant foreign ex
change flows. The direct foreign exchange cost of technology
transfer to LDCs in 1968 was $1.5 billion. These direct costs
were equal to about 5 percent of their total exports (exclud
ing petroleum) and 8 percent of their import of machinery,
equipment and chemicals. There were as much as 37 percent of
public debt service payments and 56 percent of the annual flow
of direct foreign investment. This places a heavy strain on
the scarce foreign exchange of LDCs and the burden on their
balance of payments is quite high. The problem of cost is
excerbated when one considers that parts and services for
maintenance will have to be continually imported. Some of
these services are acquired on credit basis which prompts one
26
to also take into account the debt problems of LDCs. The world
bank estimated that the external public debt of 96 LDCs in
creased by $51 billion or about 25 percent in 1978 to a total
of $253 billion. The private debt increased by no more than
$7 billion.20 Table 6 shows debt service payments as a per
centage of the export of goods and services. The debt service
payments have been increasing almost twice as fast as export
earnings in LDCs. They were as high as 30 percent for some
countries. The rising debt service payments have placed a
growing claim on the exports of LDCs. As Albert Fishlow and
others remarked, the debt problem is not really a question of
repayment by LDCs. Rather, it is the constraint upon their
growth prospects that is of significance.21 The huge foreign
debt of LDCs imposes a serious constraint upon their future
growth prospects, especially their ability to purchase foreign
technology. While the debt problem of LDCs is not yet out of
control, the possibility of sluggish growth or recession in the
ensuing years cannot be ruled out. A combination of rising
debt service payments with stagnating exports cannot be ex
cluded. This could lead to defaults and reschedulings that
would severely undermine LDCs access to technology in the
future. In the event that the debt service payments become
burdensome and make heavy demands on scarce foreign exchange,
20.'World Bank, 1979 Annual Reports, p. 14.
21Albert Fishlow; R. S. Weinert; M. V. N. Witman; K.
Lipper and H. B. Junz, "The Third World: Public Debt Private
Profits," Foreign Policy, no. 30 (Spring 1978), p. 134.
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LDCs will have to meet their debt service commitments and re
strain their import of technology.
While it is true that the continuing high cost of re
search and development efforts contribute a lot to the high
cost of technology, this does not justify the tied in clauses
which is sometimes responsible for the extra high cost of
technology transfer to LDCs. We shall assess the much talked
about "code of conduct" on the transfer of technology which is
supposed to minimize these problems and help facilitate the
transfer to LDCs.
TABLE 5
DIRECT COSTS OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELEVANT FOREIGN
EXCHANGE FLOWS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1968a
Flows
Value (millions Proportion of direct payments for
of dollars) transfer of technology (percent)
Outflows
1. Direct payment for transfer of technology (patents, licenses, know-how
trademarks, and management and other technical services) 1,500 100
2. Technology-related payments:
(a) Imports (elf) of machinery and equipment (excluding passenger
vehicles) and of chemicals 18,420 8
(b) Profit on direct foreign investment (excluding oil-producing
countries)1* 1,721 87
3. Service payments on external public debt 4,022 37
Inflows
4. Non-petroleum exports (f.o.b.) 29,350 5
5. Total official flows 6,710 22
6. Direct foreign Investment (including reinvested earnings) 2,700 56
Sources:
Line 1: UNCTAD secretariat estimates (see text).
Line 2: (a) United Nations, monthly Bulletin of Statistics, vol. XXVI, no. 7 (July 1972).
(b) "The Outflow of Financial Resources from Developing Countries: Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat" (TD/118/Supp.5), loc cit.
Line 3: IBRD/IDA, Annual Report. 1972.
Lines 4, 5, and 6: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1972 (United Nations publication, Sales No.
E/F.72.11.d.3).
bData do not include Southern European countries.




SERVICE PAYMENTS ON EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS
PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS
AND SERVICES, 1971-77
Region Service payments as percentage of exports
Country of goods and services
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
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NOTE: Debt service ratios are based on debt service actually paid as
reported by the countries and not on contractual service due.
Information on the sources, definitions, and interpretation of
the data is given in the "General Notes to Annex Tables."
1) Because on special monetary arrangements pecualir to countries such as
this, the debt service ratio must be regarded with more than usual caution
in considering the country's external financial situation. 2) Includes
a notional share of debt service payments on loans to the East African
Community: Kenya-50%, Tanzania-40%, Uganda-10%. 3) Service payments for
these years reflect prepayments. 4) Includes figures up to 1974 relating
to debt subsequently taken over by Bangladesh. P = Preliminary.
SOURCE: World Bank and IMF.
CHAPTER 3
CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY FROM DCs TO LDCs
Technology Transfer and Dependency
One of the substantive issues in the NIEO proposal on
technology transfer is the formulation of an international
code of conduct for such transfer, taking into account above
all the needs and interests of LDCs. In order to critically
evaluate such a code, it is important that we examine the pro
posal in terms of the sources of implementation. It is also
important that we examine the question of ownership and how it
has imposed restrictions on the acquisition of technology by
LDCs.
Since the end of the second world war, one of the most
important features of the international system has been the tre
mendous increase in the number of independent countries operat
ing within it. There were sixty members in 1950; today the UN
membership numbers 132. Equally important, is the fact that
most of these countries within this system are poor and weak
when compared with the relatively small number of industrial
ized countries of Europe, Japan and the United States. The
strong nations also own most of the technologies needed by the
weak nations. Therefore, a major problem affecting the
32
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potential effectiveness of the proposal on technology transfer
is the issue of dependency. No one can deny the interdepen
dence among nations in the international economic system.
However, there is great asymetry in this interdependency
which takes the form of dependence for some countries although
the kind and degree of such dependence may differ between coun
tries. It is important that we distinguish between two kinds
of dependency: (1) Extreme dependency, and (2) Simple depen
dency. Extreme dependency is a situation in which the economic
development and expansion of certain countries is conditioned
by the development and expansion of other countries. The rela
tion of interdependence between two or more economies, and be
tween these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence
when some countries (the dominant ones) that have the tech
nology, commercial and capital resources can grow and expand,
while the other countries (the dependent ones) can only develop
as a reflection of this expansion.
Thus, LDCs may be considered as extreme dependencies,
although the degree of such dependency may vary from one LDC
to another. Let us use Brazil as an example to illustrate this
point. The industrial expansion of Brazil, and her overall eco
nomic performance has been remarkable. Since 1971, the Brazil
ian economy has been growing at an average annual rate of about
L. Johnson, "Dependence and the International
System," in Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin American
Political Economy, ed., James D. Cockraft and Andre' G. Frank
(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1972), p. 71.
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10 percent. J Brazil is endowed with rich mineral resources.
Despite this phenomenal growth rate and her mineral resources,
Brazil has a shortage of capital and technology. She is
heavily dependent on foreign capital and technology from DCs
to undertake her industrial development. Thus, Brazil is an
extremely dependent state although to a lesser degree that
most LDCs, e.g., (MSA). ^ Simple dependency is a situation in
which the economies of certain countries can expand and develop
with the minimum of interference from external sources. This
is largely because such countries possess the capital and tech
nological know-how to undertake their development projects.
Thus, DCs may be considered as simple dependencies, although
the degree of such dependency may vary from one DC to another.
DCs are 'quite dependent on imports of some raw materials for
their industrial economies. For example, all the natural
rubber these countries use must be imported. A high percentage
of chromium, cobalt and manganese, etc. must also be imported.
But Japan is slightly more of a simple dependency than U.S. or
E.E.C. since she imports more of the raw materials that she
needs. Table 7 shows the United States, European Economic Com
munity and Japanese import dependence on selected industrial
raw materials, 1975. All three groups of countries import all
of their natural rubber, an average of 96 percent of their
chromium and an average of 98 percent of their cobalt, etc.
_, _ 23saburo.0kita Japan in the World Economy (Tokyo:
The Japan Foundation, 197yy, p. x73.
Most Seriously affected Countries. See Abbreviations,
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TABLE 7
U. S., EEC, AND JAPANESE IMPORT DEPENDENCE ON
SELECTED INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, 1975 (NET





























































Source: Based on data from International Report of the President trans
mitted to Congress, January 1977 (Washington, D. C: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 187.
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The U.S. is slightly less dependent on imports than either the
EEC or Japan since it is a net exporter of some raw materials.
Let us now consider the extent to which LDCs are de
pendent in the international economic system. LDCs depend
heavily on DCs in the international economic system. They ex
port virtually all of their export products to DCs, and import
virtually all of their manufactured goods from DCs. This ex
treme dependence on exports which consists mainly of raw
materials leads to a deterioration in the terms of trade for
LDCs. The much needed foreign exchange for technology trans
fer comes from sale of their export to DCs, which as a result
of the deteriorating terms of trade will serve to purchase less
and less of technology commodities. Table 8 analyzes, for 1976,
the exports and imports of DCs and LDCs, dividing them by cate
gories of goods. In 1976, LDCs exports consisted of 81.2 per
cent of raw or semi-raw materials. Their export of manufactured
goods amounted to 18.5 percent. The import of manufactured
goods was estimated to be 65.9 percent. Table 9 lists the
prices of fifteen major primary commodity exports of developing
market economies, 1973-1977 (annual and quarterly). We can see
the wide fluctuations in world prices of many of the raw mate
rials for which LDCs are major exporters. This severely affect
the earnings of these countries from year to year. The average
world price of sugar, for example, increased from thirteen
cents per pound in 1973 to thirty-four cents per pound in 19 74,
and, by the fourth quarter of 1977, had fallen to seven cents
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TABLE 8
COMPOSITION OF WORLD EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY
GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1976 (percentages)
Developed Developing Centrally
Market Market Planned
Economies Economies Economies World
Primary Products
Food, beverages, and tobacco
Crude materials (excluding
fuels); oils and fats










Food, beverages, and tobacco
Crude materials (excluding
fuels); oils and fats



























































































World import figures include certain imports, which, because their
regions of destination could not be determined, are not otherwise in
cluded in the import figures in this table.
NOTE: Data do not include trade among the centrally planned economies
of Asia, the export of Rhodesia, or the trade between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
Source: Based on data from United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statis
tics, vol. 32, no. 6 (June 1978), Special Table F
TABLE 9
PRICES OF FIFTEEN MAJOR PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING
MARKET ECONOMIES, 1973-1977 (annual and quarterly)












Iron 0re9 ($ met. ton)
Cocoa10 (cents/lb.)
Phosphate Rock11 ($/met. ton)
Tin12 (cents/lb.)
Maize13 ($ met. ton)








































































































































































^Ranked by average value of exports in 1973-1975 period.
ilSaudla Arabia
fWorld
Average of Angola, Brazil, Colombia and Cuatemala for
1973-1976; average of Colombia and Guatemala for 1977.
-London Metal Exchange
^Average of Ivory Coast and Philipines
^Average of United States and Mexico




{^Average of Malaysia, United Kingdom, and U.S.
[^United States
.-Thailand
;?Average of Argentina and Australia
Average price at London auctions
from World Bank, Economic Analysis and Projections Department. "°?£?dl^Prlce




Figure 1 gives some idea of the deviations from the
long run trend using World Bank index of terms of trade for
non-petroleum primary commodities, 1954-1975 period. The fluc
tuations seem to be fairly large as could be seen in the move
ment from 1972 to peak 1974. Third World countries have ex
perienced greater instability in their export earnings than
have advanced countries. This is basically because of concen
tration of market power in developed countries and achievement
25
of technological progress. LDCs depend heavily on DCs for
FIGURE 1
World Bank Index of the Terms of Trade
of Primary Commodities, 1954-1975
1934
Source: ' Jere R. Behrnan, Development, the International Econo
mic Order, and Commodity Agreements (Reading; Addison-
Wesley Company), 1978, p. 48.
253Jere R. Behrnan, Development, The International Econo
mic Order, and Commodity AgFeements (Reading: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 54-55.
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skilled labour and technological know-how to develop their
economies. There is a low level of technical knowledge in
LDCs as compared with DCs. This can be substantiated by the
low participation of LDCs in the ownership of patents. UNCTAD
estimated that only 6 percent or 200,000 of the 3.5 million
patents in existence in 1972 were granted by LDCs and that
less than one-sixth of that total was owned by nationals of
these countries (LDCs).26 There is a shortage of relatively
high level skills needed in order to make technological
choices, to appraise the different technologies in DCs and to
carry out research on development of indigenous technologies.
There is also a shortage of the other common expertise needed
in order to use tools and operate mechanical equipment. Table
10 shows the decidedly low endowment of LDCs as compared with
DCs in terms of skills. In 1970, there was an average of only
about 6 engineers and scientists per 10,000 population for
the eight African countries for which data were available, com
pared with 22 for Asia and 69 for Latin America. This con
trasts sharply with a figure of 112 per 10,000 population in DC
market economies. The poor performance of LDCs repeats itself
for every socio-economic indicator in the table.
This extreme dependence on LDCs makes them relatively
highly constrained by the international environment on most
issues most of the time. The market for technology comprises
26U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The
Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries (New York: U.N. Publications, 1975) , p.4L
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TABLE 10
TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE: SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC
INDICATORS (Averages expressed as medians for
1976 or latest year available)
Developed Developing countries
market and territories
economy , hi cl d/
countries- Africa- Asia- Latin America-
I. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(i) Ratio of total stock of
scientists and engineers
per 10,000 pop. 112 5.8 22.0 69
(ii) Ratio of technicians
per 10,000 142.3 8.3 23.4 72.2
(iii) Scientists and engineers
engaged in R & D per
10,000 pop. 10.4 0.35 1.6 1.15
(iv) Technicians engaged in
R & D per 10,000 pop. 8.2 0.4 0.6 1.4
(v) Expenditure on R & D as
percentage of GNP 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.2
II. HIGH LEVEL MANPOWER
(vi) Professionals and tech
nicians as percentage of
economically active pop. 11.1 ... 2.7 5.7
(vii) Percentage of the economi
cally active population
employed in manufacturing
sector 25.4 3.5 10.5 14.1
(viii) Literacy rates _/ High- Low-
(percent) 96^ 20 15 32 77
(ix) Ratio of primary and
secondary enrollment to <
school age population 92- 32 56 78
42
Sources: (i) - (iv): UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1973, table
8.3; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1974, table 199.
(iv) and (w): ILO, Yearbook of Statistics, 1974, tables 2A and
2B.
(viii) and (ix): Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics, supplement for 1973, table 6.8
a/ The size of the sample in this column varies by indicator, ranging from
four countries in line (ii) to 25 countries in line (ix).
b/ The size of the sample in this column varies by indicator, ranging from
eight countries in lines (i) and (ii) to 46 countries in lines (viii) and
(ix).
cj Excludes China. The size of the sample in this column varies by indi
cator, ranging from seven countries in line (vi) to 36 countries in lines
(viii) and (ix).
d/ The size of the sample in this column varies by indicator, ranging from
7even countries in lines (i) and (ii) to 43 in line (viii).
ej Includes Greece and Turkey.
£/ Taking upper limit of estimates where no precise figures were given,
e.g., for 10-15 percent, 15 percent would be used for high estimates and
10 percent for low estimate.
Note: The classification used in this table is intended for statistical
convenience and does not necessarily imply any judgment regarding the
stage of development of any particular country.
TNCs and LDCs, both acting as sellers and buyers of technology
respectively. Technology which could be in the form of pure
knowledge or embodied in foreign investment or machinery is
transferred under terms that are the outcome of negotiations
between TNCs and LDCs. The final outcome depends on the rela
tive bargaining strength of these two groups. It is highly
probable that LDCs will fare worst because of their weak bar
gaining power vis-a-vis TNCs. The weak bargaining power of
LDCs is a result of the absence or weakness of institutional
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mechanisms to control the behavior of TNCs and their subsid
iaries. Thus, the concept of technological dependence permits
us not only to see the dependence of LDCs on an international
scale, but the internal situation in these countries which is
one of poor technological infrastructure. Where LDCs depend
on certain DCs for loans with which to purchase technology,
their freedom to seek alternative technologies is severely cur
tailed. What we see is a transfer of technology that is suited
to the monopolistic advantage of TNCs, but is detrimental to
LDCs. A continued transfer of technology without a qualitative
improvement of the technical infrastructure in LDCs, will only
keep LDCs more dependent on DCs technologically. We shall now
look at the ownership of technology by examining the patent
system to illustrate further the non-existence or weakness of
technological institutions in LDCs.
The Patent System in the Transfer of
Technology to LDCs
Most of the technologies in the world are owned by DCs
and their corporations (TNCs). These ownership_ rights are in
stitutionalized through the award of patents. In his study
of the patent system in LDCs, Surendra J. Patel has observed:
"one of the important determinants of the conditions governing
access to technical knowledge is the nature, extent and func
tioning of patent regulations at both national and interna
tional levels."27 It is, therefore, important that we examine
27Surendra J. Patel, "The Patent System and the Third
World." World Development, vol. 2, no. 9 (1974):3.
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the question of ownership in the transfer process by analyzing
the role of patents in LDCs. Such analysis is of crucial sig
nificance to an assessment of the possibilities for improved
technology transfer to LDCs.
The International Union for the Protection of Indus
trial Property, which was instituted in 1833, is responsible
for regulating patents. The Union comprises about eighty
28
members, of which forty-two are from the Third World. The
primary objective of the organization is to ensure that equal
treatment is accorded to foreigners and nationals, whose coun
tries are members of the patent convention, in the granting
of patents. The underlying assumption of patent law is that
inventions are good in themselves, and the granting of certain
rights over inventions to the individual inventor, is soci
ety's best way of rewarding him for his resources and inge
nuity. In other words, patent offers an inventor some rewards
for his invention and encourages him to invent. The original
goals of the Union were to prevent the exploitation of LDCs
by DCs in the technology market, and to ensure that society
benefits from the invention through the disclosure of all the
technical information that is vital to others who may want to
use the invention. Therefore, the rationale of the modern
patent system is the dissemination of invention for the bene
fit of society rather than the reward to the inventor. The
E. Penrose, "International Patent and Less Developed
Countries," The Economic Journal, vol. 83, no. 331 (September
1973):768.
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strategies adopted to realize these goals include compulsory
29
licensing and compulsory working of the patents. Despite
these international safeguards, almost all patents in LDCs
are now owned by few foreign companies. Penrose has observed
that "in LDCs foreigners typically take from three-fourths to
well over 90 percent of the patents granted, and these may be
30
highly concentrated in the hands of a very few companies."
Table 11 indicates the nature of ownership as between countries
and group of countries. In 1972 DC market economies owned
95.6 percent of all patents granted to foreigners whereas LDCs
owned about 0.6 percent. The U.S. held the highest, followed
by West Germany.
DCs and their corporations-TNCs have emerged as mono
polies in the world technological market. The monopoly con
trol of patents by TNCs has been used to minimize competition
and to transfer technology in keeping with their strategies
of profit maximization. Strategies such as restrictive licen
sing and direct foreign investment wherever possible have been
31
employed to achieve these ends.
While licensing was originally conceived as a means to
hasten the process of diffusion of technological know-how, a
Pedro Roffe, "Abuses of Patent Monopoly: A Legal
Appraisal," World Development, vol. 2, no. 9 (September 1974):
15.
Penrose, The Economic Journal, 769.
31Constantine Vaitsos, "Patents Revisited: Their Func
tion in Developing Countries," Development Studies, vol. 9,
no. 1 (October 1972):78.
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Source: The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries (New York: U. N.
Publications, 1975), p. 38.
high concentration of patents in a few corporations has re
sulted in discriminating practices in the issuing of licenses.
In LDCs where the state of industrial development is low, TNCs
withhold licenses. In the event that licenses are granted, a
policy of cross-licensing is often adopted so as to aid in
avoiding market segmentation. Cross-licensing is a method
whereby patent holders pool patents and through mutual agree
ment, monopoly privileges are integrated into a grand scheme
to divide world markets. Then, under these market conditions,
32ibid. , p. 78.
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technology is transferred from the country of the patent holder
to LDCs. Licensing, such as this, has now become a multi-bil
lion dollar business. "In 1970, the U.S. received 2.4 billion
dollars in royalties while paying but 230 million dollars for
the acquisition of foreign technology."■" Another restrictive
licensing practice in technology transfer is that of terri
torial restrictions. This method restricts the territories in
which the licensee could use the patents. 34- For example, it
could accord the licensee the right to use the patents only in
his country or a specified geographic location. It could also
prohibit the licensee from exporting the products manufactured
under the license to specified locations. Package licensing is
another form of restrictive business practice relating to
patents and licenses. In package licensing, the licensee is
required to license all patents owned in a particular field,
and the licensor will refuse.license for anything less than the
entire group of patents.^5 This restriction compels LDCs to
accept more licenses than they actually need. Tied purchase
clauses are frequently inserted into patent licensing agreements.
This obliges the licensee to obtain goods from the patent
33
Jacques Raffin, "Transfer of Technology Through Inter
national Licensing," in Technology Transfer, ed., Harold F.
Davidson, p. 472.
34qeCD, Restrictive Business Practices Relating to
Patents and Licenses: Report by the Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices (Paris: OECD Publications Office,
1972), p. 15.
35
UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology (New York: UNCTAD Publications, 1972), p. 21.
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holder.36 DCs will transfer technology by means of direct
foreign investment whenever possible. Direct foreign invest
ment generally comes as a package together with management and
marketing services. The foreign subsidiary takes up residence
in the LDC and ensures the availability of techniques thought
best suited for the deveopoment plans of the nation.
Restrictive practices in the matter of patents and
licenses constitute a barrier to the transfer of technology,
and prevents the maximum utilization of technology as LDCs see
fit. Tied purchase clauses deprive LDCs of exploring the mar
ket for a better deal on such inputs. LDCs are faced with only
one price from the supplier, which could be higher than other
sources in the market. Because of this monopoly control, the
supplier is able to charge higher prices for technology that
could otherwise be obtained elsewhere at a much lower price.
Such transfer "packages" maintain the dependence of LDCs on
specific foreign supplier. Technology transfer agreement with
territorial restriction affects the export potential of LDCs.
LDCs need to export manufactures where and whenever possible.
Therefore, restrictions of this kind limit the benefits to LDCs
from exporting goods to where they may be primarily needed.
Direct foreign investment as a means of technology transfer has
also been detrimental to the economies of LDCs. Direct foreign
investment enables TNCs to exercise greater control over the
technology often to the detriment of LDCs. The profits that
36Ibid., p. 22.
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are repatriated by TNCs to their home countries after the
initial investments are made aggravate the extent of inequality
between DCs and LDCs. Dependency theorists have referred to
this as a process of "decapitalization," and recent evidence
substantiates this. Table 12 presents some data that clearly
demonstrate the imbalance created by direct foreign investment
in favour of TNCs1 home countries as a result of repatriated
profits. In the years 1965 to 1970, the difference between
new investment inflows into LDCs and investment outflows on
direct foreign investment amounted to $37,692.6 million. '
The patent system has made it possible for TNCs to
monopolize technology and thereby use it for economic gains.
It has not accelerated the transfer of technology to LDCs. It
is now clear that ownership can mean a great deal in terms of
negative effects of technology transfer on the socio-economic
development of LDCs via foreign exchange deficits, repatria
tion of profits and restrictive licensing. Such restrictive
business practices in technology transfer only increase LDCs'
technological dependency and continued acquisition of foreign
technology does not answer their development needs. Technology
transfer will not bring about economic development to LDCs, be
cause such transfers, with the limitations imposed by DCs, do
not serve the interests of LDCs. LDCs have proposed to control
such restrictive practices which hinder the effective transfer
of technology from DCs to LDCs by the formulation of a code of
37See Table 12.
TABLE 12
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CURRENT INFLOW OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND OUTFLOW OF INCOME ON ACCUMULATED





























































































































































































































































































aAll statistics—inflows and outflows—are expressed in gross figures.
Excluding Algeria.
CEthiopia, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tunisia.
Algeria, Libyan Arab Republic, and Nigeria.
eArgentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam and Trinidad
and Tobago.
Venezuela.
Indonesia, Israel, Lebanon, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam.
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
Source: United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Multinational Corporations
in World Development (New York, 1974).
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S3
conduct governing the transfer of technology to LDCs.
Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology
The NIEO proposal on Transfer of technology states that
all efforts should be made: "To formulate an international
code of conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to
O Q
needs and conditions prevalent in developing countries.'
There has been extensive discussion at the international level
of the possibility or desirability of such a code. Rival
drafts have been prepared by DCs and LDCs. The Pugwash Con
ferences on Science and World Affairs adopted in April 1974, a
draft code in this field.3^ Also in May 1975, an Intergovern
mental Group of Experts submitted two draft outlines for the
preparation of an international code of conduct for the trans
fer of technology to UNCTAD's Committee on Transfer of Tech
nology: Brazil submitted one on behalf of the "Group of 77,"
and Japan submitted the other one on behalf of the "Group B"
Countries.^ while there seems to be a broad consensus between
DCs and LDCs with regard to the necessity of a code, it should
be emphasized that such consensus comes from two different
groups—suppliers and receivers of technology with somewhat
conflicting interests. Any regulation imposed by one group
upon either end of the transactions necessarily affects the
interests of the other group as partners in the trade of
38U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 3201(S-VI), p. 115.
3^ Appendix C
Appendices A and B.
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technology. Therefore, it is important that we take a closer
look at this code, because it is not quite clear "whether such
a code's establishment might not simply generate a new inter
national bureaucracy with imprecise functions and limited
power."^
What functions would a code serve in the international
flow of technologies? According to UNCTAD:
The aim of an international code of conduct in the
field of transfer of technology would thus be to
define certain internationally acceptable standards
of technology transfer transactions among countries
and to lay down the ground rules governing trade
practices of technology transactions of individuals
or enterprises of the various countries, with a view
to achieving a certain order, fairness and predict
ability in the field of technology trade operations.^2
It has already been pointed out in the preceding section, that
the present system of international technology transfer is
marked by restrictive practices that limit the benefits to be
derived from such transfers to LDCs. Given these restrictive
practices and the inherent weaknesses of LDCs vis-a-vis DCs, an
"internationalized" framework for the regulation of technology
transactions is required. Within this framework, a code would
have to establish rules for a more equitable distribution of
costs and benefits of technology transfer, while taking into
account the special needs of LDCs. In pursuing these objectives,
^G. K. Helleiner, "International Technology Issues:
Southern Needs and Northern Responses," in The New International
Economic Order: The North-South Debate, ed. Jagdish N. Bhagwati
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 19 77), p. 304.
42unctAD, An International Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology, p. (T
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the code would have to deal with the following problem areas:^
(a) To control and regulate the costs of tech
nology, especially those arising from
transfer pricing and accounting.
(b) To eliminate the many restrictions
associated with the transfer of tech
nology to LDCs.
(c) To give LDCs access to unpackage technology.
(d) To establish international rules that will
act as a safeguard to national laws and
policies on transfer of technology.
Given the structure of the present international econo
mic order with its unequal distribution of resources, power
and knowledge, and taking into account the strong resistance
against a code by DCs, any code that will be adopted is likely
to have some shortcomings that will not overcome most of the
limitations of technology transfer to LDCs. (a) Any code that
will be adopted will tend to be too general in nature to become
an effective instrument'for the regulation of international
transfer of technology. As Mr. Helleiner puts it:
It seems safe to conclude that any code that could
at present gain the agreement of both rich countries
and of poor would be rife with escape clauses, and
almost certainly not be legally binding.^
(b) It is unlikely that DCs will lessen their resistance
against the adoption of an international code that will be
legally binding. (c) It is unlikely that an effective and
seem to be the main objectives. Other objec
tives are either complementary or supplementary.
Helleiner, "International Technology Issues; Southern
Needs and Northern Responses," in The New International Economic
Order, ed. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, p. 303.
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generally acceptable method and institutions for the settlement
of disputes will be enacted.
We shall now discuss these in detail. Although the
existing draft codes differ to some extent, they all have one
characteristic in common: they all contain some general cri
teria with regard to the prevention of restrictive business
practices. They all suggest some principles concerning the
special requirements of LDCs. Vaitosos observed that: the
principles have been included in many UN resolutions,
... but that up to now have not had any major
repercussions on actual business conduct-on
account of the power relation and relative
knowledge (or ignorance) among participants
about the foreign investment process.45
Chapter IV of the Group of 77's revised draft outline of a code
enumerates, for example, altogether forty types of restrictive
business practices in the transfer of technology to LDCs.^°
These are restrictive business practices in technology trans
actions that governments of LDCs hope to prohibit. A code could
not adequately deal with forty problem areas. Let us consider
the pricing of technology since this is of much concern to LDCs.
To some extent, technology transfer is costly because of intra-
firm transfer pricing. However, it will be extremely difficult
if not impossible for a code to effectively deal with the mech
anism of transfer pricing. Constantine Vaitsos has stated the
^5Constantine Vaitsos, "Foreign Investment and Produc
tion Knowledge," in Beyond Dependence: The Developing World
Speaks Out, ed. Gary F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab (Washington,
D. C.: O.D.C., 1976), p. 88.
46See Appendix B, pp. 84-88.
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problem in this manner:
What is the 'just' price that a host country should
pay for the training or R and D expenses of Swiss
pharmacologist, Japanese auto engineers, or U.S.
electronic specialist whose costs are charged by the
parent firms in selling to or buying from their
foreign subsidiaries? Or what is a 'fair' price
that a host country should pay to cover part of the
expenses of foreign firms lobbying in the home coun
try for the application of economic sanctions in
case of nationalization of their assets abroad?^7
It is seriously questionable whether a code will be able to deal
effectively with the many restrictions that usually accompany
the transfer of technology to LDCs.
Even if the code is effective enough to deal with some
of the major problems of transfer of technology to LDCs, the
question of whether the code can effectively sanction these
guidelines that they become internationally binding remains to
be answered. Whereas the "Group of 77" has opted for an inter
national code that will be legally binding, DCs prefer a code
that is non-binding in character.
There are signs that some LDCs may be inclined to make
some compromise by the adoption of the Pugwash draft code (this
code had been unanimously adopted by participants from DCs,
Socialist countries and LDCs). However, the question of settle
ment of disputes remains a highly controversial subject. The
Pugwash draft code identified four minimum requirements with
regard to the establishment of an effective machinery for the
settlement of disputes:
47Vaitsos, "Foreign Investment and Productive Knowledge,"
in Beyond Dependence, pp. 88-90.
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(i) The technology transfer agreements between
technology suppliers and recipients from
different countries should be subject, with
regard to their scope, enforcement and inter
pretation, to the laws of the technology-
receiving country;
(ii) In the event of a dispute between a supplier
of technology and a recipient of technology,
legal jurisdiction for settlement of the dis
pute shall reside in the courts of the tech
nology receiving country;
(iii) If the laws applicable to the transfer agree
ment do not exclude recourse to arbitration
in this field and the parties concerned agree
in their contracts to submit their possible
disputes to arbitration, such disputes will
be settled according to the procedures set
out in the contract;
(iv) In order to permit the solution of technical
disputes at an early stage and thus minimize
the need for legal arbitration or judicial
settlement of disputes, parties may insert
in their arbitration procedures provisions
whereby disputes of a technical nature would
be submitted as soon as possible after they
arrive to impartial technical experts appointed
in a way acceptable to all parties concerned.4°
So far, both DCs and LDCs have not made any compromise.
Whereas the "Group of 77" declare that with regard to the
settlement of disputes pertaining to transfer of technology
transactions, only the technology-receiving country shall exer
cise legal jurisdiction and that:
Any dispute among the states with regard to the inter
pretation of the present code shall be settled through
consultation and through such conciliation and arbitra
tion procedures as may be established by the states
concerned. ^
Appendix C, pp. 95-96.
Appendix B, p.. .90.
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The "Group B" draft states "that the parties to a contract
shall be free to have recourse to international arbitraton or
other appropriate methods of dispute settlement where they so
agree."^0 Thus, it would be highly unrealistic to expect the
adoption of a legally binding internatinal code of conduct on
technology transfer. In the next chapter, we shall take a look
at the infrastructure in LDCs.
See Appendix A, p. 7 7.
CHAPTER 4
LDCs TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
Transfer of Technology and the Brain Drain
In this chapter, we shall be concerned with the infra
structure in LDCs for an effective transfer of technology, and
some policy recommendations for the successful transfer of
technology to these countries. This chapter will not only
attempt to point out the weak technological infrastructure in
LDCs, it will also show how this problem is compounded by the
migration of skilled personnel from LDCs to DCs. At the end
of the chapter, we shall make some policy recommendations
that will be a step towards achieving some of the objectives
of the NIEO proposal on technology transfer.
The infrastructure of a country embraces factors such
as the skills and educational levels of the labour force, mar
keting, distribution, transportation and other public ser
vices. An acceptable infrastructure for the effective utili
zation of transferred technology includes a pool of scientists,
technicians and engineers, marketing and distributive capa
cities, etc. As has been shown earlier in this study, the
technological gap between DCs and LDCs is enormous. This is
more so in the field of research and development where 10.4
60
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scientists and engineers per 10,000 people do research, while
in LDCs, the figure is 0.35 for Africa, 1.6 for Asia and 1.15
for Latin America.
One reason for the proposal to transfer technology
from DCs to LDCs is to lessen the dependency of LDCs on foreign
technology, and to bridge the enormous technological gap be
tween DCs and LDCs. It is, therefore, paradoxical that reverse
transfer of technology (brain drain) will be taking place while
serious negotiations for transfer of technology is still in
progress. However, this has been the case for the past decade
or more. A large scale exodus of skilled labour and experts
have been migrating to DCs. Some of these people have obtained
their education and training at the expense of their countries.
Table 13 shows the contribution to the U.S. net income gain by
LDCs from skilled immigration into the U.S. in 1970. According
to this table, income from work and services of highly skilled
personnel who migrated to the U.S. from LDCs amounted to al
most $3.7 billion in 1970. India and the Philippines were the
largest contributor with $874.5 million and $880.6 million re
spectively. This total has much significance when compared with
some other relevant magnitudes. This figure of $3.7 billion
accounts for over 0.3 percent of the U.S. GDP, about 14 percent
of the total U.S. expenditures on research and development and
almost 39 percent of U.S. current expenditure on higher
UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey
of Its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implication (New York:
United Nations Publication, 1979), pp. 12-13.
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education. It was further estimated that the contribution of
LDCs to the net income gain by the U.S. in only one year (1970)
amounted to about one eighth of the Marshal Plan in the post
second world war period.52
Reverse transfer of technology (brain drain) has assumed
significant dimension in the last two decades. According to
UN estimates, in the period from 1961-1976 some 300 thousand
scientists, engineers and medical doctors moved from LDCs to
DCs, mainly to the U.S., Canada and Britain. If flows to West
ern Europe are added, the cumulative total comes to about 400
thousand. During the last decade (1961-1970), 53,616 highly
skilled persons migrated to the U.S., 80 percent came from Asia,
10.8 percent came from Africa and 9.2 percent came from Latin
America. India and the Philippines rank high with 28 percent
and 21 percent immigrants resepctively.53 if we consider the
continued flow of skilled or professional personnel from LDCs
to DCs, we can safely assume that the end of reverse transfer
of technology (brain drain) is not in sight. Table 14 shows the,
inflow of scientists, engineers and physicians into the U.S.
from LDCs, 1961-1977. According to this table, professional and
technical personnel from LDCs to the U.S. increased from 1,810
in 1961 to 18,850 in 1971. The yearly migrations have continued.
Reverse transfer of technology .'(brain drain) implies a
52UNCTAD, Reverse Transfer of Technology; Economic
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SOURCE: Figures in column (1) obtained from Table B-l of Scientists,
Engineers and Physicians from Abroad: rrends Through
Year, 1970, National Scientist Foundation (Washington,
Fiscal
D. C:
June 1972), publication NSF 72-312.
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"Includes countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
C1961 was taken as the base year and the percentage (%) in
crease computed for succeeding years.
SOURCE: United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Annual Reports, 1979. Reproduced in Statistical
Abstracts, 1979, p. 628.
shortage of highly skilled manpower in LDCs. It is a reduction
in manpower accumulation and wasted educational investment.-*4-
54s. Watanabe, "The Brain Drain from Developing Coun
tries to Developed Countries," International Labour Review,
Vol. 99, No. 4 (April 1969):413
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Through the brain drain, LDCs who are technologically backward
pass on a substantial part of their technological asset to DCs,
who are technologically advanced. This reduces the technolo
gical capability of LDCs and retards their economic development.
This may increase LDCs technological dependency and continued
transfer of technology from DCs, which does not solve their
problems.
Market Mechanism and Transfer of Technology
The market mechanism in LDCs makes one seriously ques
tion the effectiveness of a transferred technology from DCs to
LDCs. While a transferred technology may function well, it may
not bring about the desired socio-economic goals if the market
ing operations are undertaken by DCs. Technology that is trans
ferred by LDCs could be used to produce finished products, how
ever, if transportation, distribution and financing, etc. are
undertaken by foreign firms, as is the case, the firms will be
the beneficiaries while LDCs will be the losers. As long as
LDCs lack the ability to undertake their own marketing opera
tions, technology transfer will not bring about a meaningful
change.
Exxon operates in the U.S. and nearly 100 other coun
tries. Its net income in 1979 was $4.3 billion. Exxon explores
for and produces crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum. In
addition to organizing its own research staff, it engages in
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refining, shipping, and marketing of chemicals. This example
illustrates that the acquisition of technology will not by it
self bring about a meaningful change when other skills which
provide for successful market operations are lacking.
Let us use the OPEC experience to further shed light on
this point. It is unquestionable that OPEC has derived enormous
revenues from her oil. However, it should be noted that this
revenue stems from the fact that OPEC owns the place where oil
is drilled. All the other productive factors such as capital
investment, exploration of oil, marketing and distribution which
also have a share in oil profits are controlled by the major oil
companies—notably Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, etc. Lommis has re
ported that Exxon's profits from its eastern hemisphere opera
tion (including Middle East) increased by $545 million in 1973.
This is a substantial increase of 83 percent. In 1973, the
time of the oil embargo, twenty-four oil companies reported an
increase in net profit of 53 percent over 1972. If the Organi
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had been able to
penetrate the market, with distribution, shipping, etc. that
were performed by companies such as Exxon, Mobil and Texaco,
etc., its present revenues would have been two or even three
times higher. Thus, it is one thing to have technology trans
ferred for drilling oil and producing goods; it is another
55Moody's, Industrial Manual, Vol. 1 (1979), pp. 638-639.
56C. J. Lommis, "How to Think About Oil Company
Profits," Fortune (April 1974), pp. 98-103.
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thing to be able to penetrate the market with distribution,
transportation and entrepreneurial capabilities, etc. to make
technology transfer effective.
People's traditional attitudes have not been positive
towards technology transfer. The will to undertake activities
that may lead to socio-economic growth and development has
been lacking. At a symposium on the "Problem of Technology
Transfer," a young man shared his experience in his native
Guyana. Mr. Kahn was trained in Production and Animal Science
at Tuskeegee Institute, Alabama, U.S.A. Upon his return home
to Guyana, he encountered many difficulties working with his
people. They were critical of his farming knowledge from
abroad; Mr. Kahn spent most of his time begging the people to
work, persuading and convincing them about the benefits of the
new and improved methods of farming. Transfer of technology
would not be effective under such circumstances. We shall now
make some policy recommendations for an effective and success
ful transfer of technology.
Policy Recommendations for Transfer*
of Technology
Technology transfer may facilitate the expansion of agri
cultural and industrial output in LDCs. It does not, as we
have seen necessarily further the capacity to adapt and modify
existing technologies or to evolve new ones. However, this is
57v. A. Kahn, "Agricultural Research: Problems of Tech
nology Transfer." Conference at Tuskeegee Institute, April 16-
18. 1980.
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necessary for technology transfer to bring about economic deve
lopment in LDCs and to lessen LDCs' technological dependence on
DCs. Therefore, our objective here will be to make some policy
recommendations for the effective and successful transfer of
technology to LDCs. These recommendations will take into con
sideration the diversity of economic structures in the Third
World.
For the effective transfer of technology and its speedy
absorption into the socio-economic system, LDCs should create
58
and develop their own technological capabilities. Govern
ments in LDCs must play a crucial role in the development of
domestic technological capabilities since the transfer of tech
nology is government's special responsibility. LDCs should make
deliberate efforts to strengthen indigenous technological ser
vice facilities, particularly engineering consulting agencies.
LDCs must set up training programmes, build technical institutes
and lay more emphasis on technical education. A well planned
training programme is the most effective means of ensuring
59
speedy absorption of transferred technology. The realignment
of education and training systems to meet the needs and demands
of LDCs should be considered.
The first step in this regard will be to bring together
58
UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by
Developing Countries (New York: UNCTAD Publications, 1978),
p. 34.
59UNCTAD, Guidelines for the Acquisition of Foreign
Technology in Developing Countries (New York: UNCTAD Publica
tions, 1973), p. 13.
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a well knit-core team of experienced and capable professionals;
such people can provide dynamic leadership for the rapid deve
lopment of domestic consultancy. With this consultancy group
in operation, sound curricula and modes of instruction that can
introduce a scientific mentality among the population at large
should be adopted. Even the least developed among the develop
ing countries have a certain number of professionals including
some engineers, scientists, technicians and agriculturists. A
good number of these professionals have impressive credentials
from institutions of higher learning in DCs. Some even publish
articles in scholarly journals. Nevertheless, they are rarely
consulted by their governments to study projects and recommend
solutions to their home countries. These professionals should
be encouraged to do all consulting work except in the areas in
which local facilities are not adequate. The mass education of
the population by professionals, as to the effects and benefits
of technology transfer should also be undertaken by a segment of
the consultancy group. This will raise the level of basic educa
tion for a successful transfer of technology.
Denis Goulet has said that, "no technology is "appro
priate" for all developmental purposes, but every technology is
"appropriate" for reaching some objective." Therefore, a trans
fer that is compatible with a policy of employment expansion and
60UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by
Developing Countries, p. 34. ~~~
61Denis Goulet, The Uncertain Promise: Value Conflicts
in Technology Transfer, p. 174. ~~~~
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economic growth, whether capital or labour intensive will be
appropriate to their development needs, and in other instances
they should appropriate already existing technologies. Third
World countries with comparative advantage in certain factors
such as oil could use their leverage to obtain extractive and
processing technology to develop their oil industries. Many
corporations in LDCs have been nationalized, but rarely has the
government in those countries seriously considered the possi
bility of appropriating the technologies owned by these corpora
tions. Local engineers in LDCs should be required to study and
remodel such technologies when possible so that they can be
adopted to the economic conditions in these countries.
Since most of the developing countries are still agrar
ian societies, the successful assimilation of agricultural tech
nology will contribute a lot to economic development. This calls
for far reaching land reforms such as relocating the rural masses
who are crowded into tiny plots of land while whole fertile
areas remain uncultivated. Governments in LDCs should establish
large-scale farms in unsettled areas. Idle school graduates and
other jobless people could be relocated to these farms. Most of
the agricultural officers who sit in offices should be required
to do field work, train and supervise relocated workers to use
modern farm implements and fertilizers. Since some of the relo
cated workers have basic high school education they can easily
be trained in the method of promotion of soil fertility, the use
of tractors and other farm implements. Private farmers who own
their farms must have more access to credit, fertilizers and
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technical advisory services. In large scale farming, modern
agricultural technology will be appropriate. The absorption of
this technology in LDCs will increse farm production and agri
cultural surpluses could be used to defray cost of technology
transfer in other sectors.
A policy of self-reliance especially in the co-operative
exchange of skills among Third World countries should be imple
mented. Some countries that are rich in skills, e.g., India
could export her skills to countries that are poor in skills.
Both countries stand to gain from such co-operative exchange.
The skill importing countries will benefit by being able to have
an access of highly skilled manpower on better terms. Skill-
exporting countries will benefit from short-term relief from un
employment and under-employment, generation of foreign exchange
earnings in the form of remittances from migrants abroad or co-
«- 62operative arrangement.
Third World countries should take more rigorous steps at
home to settle the problem of reverse transfer of technology
(brain drain). The first requirement is the acceleration of
economic development in the Third World, since the slow rate of
development is one of the fundamental reasons why trained per-
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sonnel in LDCs seek employment overseas. While development
cannot be attained overnight, nevertheless, a policy of rapid
62UNCTAD, Reverse Transfer of Technology, p. 27.
^Watanabe, "Brain Drain in Developing Countries,"
International Labour Review, p. 426.
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economic development will open new jobs and provide better con
ditions of service that will act to prevent professionals from
LDCs to seek employment abroad. Restrictive measures should
also be taken into consideration in order to reduce the brain
drain. Scholarships should be granted selectively to those
students whose study plan is in accordance with the needs of the
home country. Third World Countries should give immediate con
sideration for promoting collective self-reliance among them
selves.6^ This entials using their skilled personnel on the
basis of mutual advantage. This will mean greater co-operation
in planning, setting up of joint programmes where feasible and
more effective mutual information.
Finally, the developing countries should continue their
strategies of united action to deal with DCs. Renato Constan
tino has observed that:
... a counterforce arising from united action by the
Third World, perhaps in the form of a declaration of
determination to deny those of its resources that are
vital to these global enterprises and avanced coun- g5
tries can secure a more equitable sharing of technology.
The implementation of these policies and strategies will not
only be complimentary to technology transfer, but will
strengthen the domestic technological capabilities for an ef
fective and successful transfer of technology.
p. 53.
UNCTAD, Reverse Transfer of Technology, p. 26.
65Constantino, The Journal of Contemporary Asia,
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the thesis, it was explained that
LDCs are demanding a new international economic order for solv
ing their socio-economic problems; transfer of technology in
particular is seen as the bedrock of industrialization and
economic development.
The thesis tried to assess the proposal on technology
transfer. An attempt was made to show the inequality in the
present international economic system; and the proposal for a
new international economic order is an effort to change the
mechanisms and structures of the existing international econo
mic system to one that is more responsive to the needs of LDCs.
An attempt was made to explain the dependent nature of
the proposal on technology transfer. LDCs are extreme depen
dencies as opposed to DCs who are simple dependencies. The un
favourable terms of trade makes LDCs earn comparably less for
their exports which they depend so much on. This makes it ex
tremely difficult for LDCs to pay for technology transfer. This
problem is further aggravated by the huge debt of LDCs and the
mounting debt service payments.
Although the technology in DCs were created for their
economy, it could be used beneficially in LDCs. LDCs will have
to improve their technological infrastructure and capabilities
to absorb this new technology. An attempt to transfer
73
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technology to LDCs where skilled labour to mann such technology
is absent, will tend to be counterproductive. LDCs must im
prove their technological capabilities to enable them to appro
priate imported technology and create indigenous ones. Failure
to do this will be tantamount to perpetual dependence on DCs
technologically.
Another major issue is ownership of technology. DCs and
their corporations (TNCs) own must of the technologies needed by
LDCs. These technologies have been transferred to LDCs with
many restrictive practices, making it extremely difficult if
not impossible for LDCs to realize their fullest benefits.
In concluding this study the writer recognized that the
great inequities in the distribution of wealth and resources is
perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the contemporary
economic order. The issue of Third World poverty is real and
its magnitude cannot be reduced overnight. Technology transfer
may help to alleviate the problem, but this is not enough. The
speeches by Third World leaders in Algiers, Havana and the U.N.
have been eloquent, but eloquence and blaming the developed
countries for LDCs poverty is not coming to grips with the real
problem. Third World leaders must face the problem of just
domestic distribution. Oil income from OPEC, if used wisely
can make a dent on the problems of poverty and underdevelopment
in LDCs.
This is by no means an exhaustive treatment of the sub
ject, nevertheless, the surface has been scratched and it is
hoped that real progress will continue.
APPENDIX A
Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology Submitted by
the Expert from Japan on Behalf of the
Experts from Group B a/
Preamble (to be drafted)
I. Objectives
A universally applicable Code of Conduct for the trans
fer of technology should have the following objectives:
A. To facilitate the international transfer of technology;
B. To define general, equitable guidelines for the inter
national transfer of technology, taking account of the
legitimate interests of source and recipient enter
prises and their governments;
C. Finally, in the special case of developing countries,
to facilitate the growth of the scientific and tech
nological capabilities of these countries so as to
assist them in their efforts to fulfill their social
and development objectives.
II. Principles
Four principles underlie an international Code of this
kind for the transfer of technology.
A. First, it is essential to distinguish clearly between
the responsibilities of the parties to a transfer of
technology. These parties are:
- the source enterprise
- the recipient enterprise
- the source government
- the recipient government.
a/ Circulated as TD/B/C.6/AC.1/L.2, on 9 May 1975.
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The term "enterprise" includes corporations, partner
ships, companies, and other associations or organizations,
whether or not for pecuniary profit, and whether owned or con
trolled by either governments or private individuals. Where
the context so requires, the term also includes individuals
engaged in the transfer and receipt of technology.
A "source enterprise" is an enterprise which exports
technology, a "recipient enterprise" is one which imports tech
nology, a "source country" is a country from which technology
is exported, a "recipient country" is one into which technology
is imported, and similarly with "source governments" and "re
cipient governments."
A code should clearly indicate those matters which are
the concern of enterprises and those which are more properly
the concern of governments.
B. Such a code should be an international instrument of a non-
binding character. It is the responsibility of governments
to promote all appropriate means of facilitating the trans
fer of technology. An international code should permit
each government to so act, leaving it full and complete
freedom of decision, including the right to legislate on
the subject of technology transfer, within the framework
of international law.
C. The provision of a Code should be of a general and volun
tary nature. As a result of the diversity of the situa
tions and the parties involved, every transfer of
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technology is an individual case. Specific rules would
immediately result in their frequently being inappropriate
or counterproductive.
On the other hand, general guidelines can be useful,
provided that they are not mandatory. The failure of
parties to a mutually agreed contract to observe one or
more such guidelines should not in itself invalidate such
contract.
D. The difficulty of resolving contractual disputes makes it
important that the parties to a contract be free to have
recourse to international arbitration or other appropriate
methods of dispute settlement where they so agree.
III. Guidelines
On the basis of the above-mentioned principles and
in order to achieve the objectives cited in paragraph I,
the following guidelines should constitute a basis for any
draft of a Code of Conduct.
GUIDELINES ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
IV. Enterprises
For the maximum mutual benefit of all parties to
technology transfer agreements, the following are recognized
as important:
A. Source enterprises
1. Responsiveness, to the extent practicable, to the
social and development objectives of recipient
countries in planning strategy for employing
technology;
2. Provision, as agreed, of appropriate technology,
together with relevant supporting services and
advice;
3. Reasonableness of the terms and conditions upon
which technology is transferred, including
license fees, royalties and other charges;
4. Co-operation, to the extent feasible and appro
priate, in the development of the scientific
and technological resources of recipient enter
prises, including wherever practicable, the
training of recipient enterprise employees;
5. Utilization, to the extent practicable, of
materials, labour and technology from the
recipient country with a view to supporting
the recipient country's social and development
objectives;
6. Compliance with all applicable laws and regula
tions, including those relating to restrictive
business practices.
B. Source and recipient enterprises
1. Agreement to appropriate dispute settlement
arrangements, such as impartial fact-finding
and arbitration procedures, incorporating
mutually agreed upon choice of applicable law;
2. Observation of fair and honest business prac
tices in all respects of technology transfer
transactions;
3. Respect for agreements related to the transfer
of technology;
4. Respect for the confidentiality of trade secrets
and know-how acquired in connection with the
transfer of technology;
5. Abstention from unreasonable restrictive busi
ness practices and the abuse of a dominant mar
ket position.
C. Recipient enterprises
1. Provision to source enterprises of appropriate
information regarding relevant social and deve
lopment objectives and legislation of the recip
ient country, and such information as may be
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required for the effective utilization of the
technology transferred.
V. 'Governments
In order to foster mutually beneficial transfers of
technology, the following are recognized as important:
A. Source goverriments
1. Rendering of all practicable assistance to re
questing recipient governments in the strengthen
ing of their educational, scientific and tech
nological resources, to meet their social and
development obj ectives;
2. Encouragement of source country enterprise to
make available in technology transfer agree
ments appropriate technology, together with
relevant supporting services and advice;
3. Facilitation of access by recipient governments
and recipient enterprises to information concern
ing the availability of technology within the
source couritry.
B. Source and recipient governments
1. Acknowledgement of the importance of the trans
fer, on reasonable terms and conditions, of appro
priate technology to recipient countries for the
purpose of helping these countries achieve their
social and development objectives;
2. Consideration to establishing or strengthening
mechanisms in their respective judicial systems
for enforcing decision resulting from dispute
settlement arrangements.
3. Respect for agreements related to the transfer of
technology;
4. Clarity of laws and regulations dealing with the
transfer of technology and related matters and
their reasonable, predictable and equitable appli
cation, such laws and regulations to accord with
international law where applicable. Changes in
legislation or national objectives to be carried
out with due regard for the existing interests of
source and recipient enterprises and with due
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recognition of legal rights where contractual
andiother legal obligations are involved;
5. Adoption, to the extent permitted.by relevant
national legislation, of effective measures to
eliminate unreasonable restrictive business
practices in the transfer of technology and, to
this same end, co-operation in exchanging informa
tion and experience in seeking solutions to prob
lems arising in this area;
6. Exploration of the possibility of working towards
compatible national laws and regulations related
to technology transfers, including those dealing
with unreasonable restrictive business practices;
7. Non-imposition of unfairly discriminatory mea
sures related to payments derived from the trans
fer of technology; entrance into bilateral conven
tions for the prevention of double taxation;
8. Provision of appropriate systems for the legal
protection of industrial property rights and co
operation in exchanging information and experience
in the transfer of these rights and the adminis
tration of these systems, for the purpose of pro
tecting these rights and thereby facilitating
and encouraging the development and transfer of
technology. To this same end, entrance into and
accession to appropriate international, agree
ments , and review of the operation of such agree
ments to take account of changed circumstances.
Such agreements shall provide equitable treatment
of both source and recipient enterprises and
governments.
C. Recipient governments
1. Maintenance of an economic and legal climate con
ducive to the flow of appropriate technology and
permitting technology transfers to benefit to
the utmost all parties concerned on an equitable
basis. To this end, and with the further goal
of reducing the grounds for misunderstanding,
provision to source enterprises and governments
of appropriate information regarding relevant
social and development objectives and legislation
in the area of technology transfer.
APPENDIX B
Revised draft outline for the preparation of an
international Code of Conduct on transfer of
technology submitted by the expert from
Brazil on behalf of the experts
from the Group of 77 a/
Chapter I
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
1.1 The Code of Conduct shall have the following objectives:
(i) To establish general equitable rules for the
international transfer of technology, taking
into consideration particularly the needs of
developing countries and the legitimate in
terests of technology suppliers and technology
recipients;
(ii) To facilitate and increase the international
flow of proprietary and non-proprietary tech
nology under fair and reasonable terms and con
ditions to all countries particularly to and
from the developing countries; -
(iii) To increase the contributions of technology to
the identification and solution of specific
problems of all countries, particularly the
special problems of developing countries;
(iv) To strengthen the national technological and
scientific capabilities of all countries, in
particular of developing countries, for select
ing imported technologies, assimilating them
into their national economies and adapting them
creatively to domestic conditions, as well as
for ensuring the increasing participation of
these countries in world production and exchange
of technology;
1.2 Pursuant to these objectives, the Code of Conduct will
give effect to the following principles:
a/ Circulated as TD/B/C.6/AC.1/L.I/Rev. 1, on 16 May 1975.
81
82
(i) Improving access to technology at fair and reason
able prices and costs, both direct and indirect,
and regulating business practices particularly
those arising from transfer pricing and transfer
accounting;
(ii) Eliminating restrictive practices arising out of
or affecting technology transactions;
(iii) Promoting unpackaging of transactions involving
transfer of technology with regard to the choice
of various elements of technology, evaluation of
costs, organizational forms and institutional
channels for the transfer;
(iv) Establishing an appropriate set of guarantees to
suppliers and recipients of technology, taking
fully into account the weaker position of recip
ient enterprises of developing countries;
(v) Facilitating an orderly implementation of national
laws and policies on transfer of technology through
the establishment of minimum international stan
dards ;
(vi) Promoting the development of indigenous tech
nologies particularly in developing countries.
Chapter III
NATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS
3.1 In exercising their right to adopt legislation, policies
and/or rules for the regulation of transfer of technology
operations, states may adopt such measures as evalua
tion, negotiation, registration and renegotiation of
agreements and arrangements involving technology trans
actions .
3.2 In this connection each state may, inter alia, adopt the
following measures:
(i) Regulation of terms and conditions of agreements
and arrangements governing transfer of technology;
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(ii) Regulation for the prevention of ultimate loss
of ownership and/or control of domestic recip
ient enterprises to foreign interests as a con
dition to or as a result of the transfer of tech
nology;
(iii) Stipulation that foreign collaboration arrange
ments must not displace national enterprises
from the domestic market;
(iv) Choice of channels, mechanisms and organizational
forms for the transfer of technology;
(v) Regulation of the level of domestic credit facil
ities that may be made available to foreign
owned or controlled enterprises involved in the
transfer of technology, as well as requirement
for adequate assurances of related foreign finan
cing where it forms part of the transfer of tech
nology arrangement;
(vi) Requirement of specifying distinctly as far as
may be deemed necessary, each item in a technology
package for which payments have to be made by the
recipient, and the duration and other modalities
of such payments;
(vii) Regulation of the level and modalities of payments
and remittances related to the transfer of tech
nology operations, including foreign exchange
obligations, prices for imported inputs and the
tax treatment to be accorded to such transactions.
(viii) Treatment of payments for technology as profits
where there exist relations between or among sub
sidiaries and parent companies, and also where
the supplier and the recipient enterprises form
an economic unit or have community of interest,
as well as when the effective technical, adminis
trative, financial or commercial management is
not exercised by local residents of the recipient
country;
(ix) Assist interested parties in the evaluation,
negotiation and renegotiation of technology
transactions in accordance with the socio-
economic conditions and needs, priorities, and
laws, regulations, rules and policies of the
recipient country;
(x) Define the scope and objectives of the trans
actions, the rights and obligations of the
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parties, the price and levels and modalities
of payments, the duration and other relevant
elements of the arrangements for the screening
and registration of technology transactions;
(xi) Establish or strengthen mechanisms in adminis
trative systems for proper enforcement of the
rights and obligations flowing from the tech
nology transfer transactions.
Chapter IV
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS
4.1 Transfer of technology arrangments shall not include
clauses or practices which impose restrictions that
directly or indirectly have or may have adverse effects
on the national economy of the recipient country.
4.2 The following clauses or practices, inter alia, whether
part of written arrangements or not, shall be considered
as restrictive business practices:
(i) Restrictions on the recipient's volume, scope
and/or range of production and/or field of
activity;
(ii) Restrictions on obtaining competing or complemen
tary technology through patents and know-how
from other sources with regard to the sale or
manufacture of competing products;
(iii) Limitations by the supplier regarding the source
of supply of raw materials, spare parts, inter
mediate products and capital goods;
(iv) Use of quality controls or standards by the sup
plier as a means of imposing unwarranted obliga
tions on the technology recipients;
(v) Limitations upon the diffusion and/or further use
of technology already imported, and thus requiring
additional payments for repeated use of the same
technology;
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(vi) Requirements that the recipient pay royalties
during the entire duration of manufacture of a
product or the application of the process in
volved and, therefore, without any specifica
tion of time;
(vii) Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of the
technology after the normal expiration of the
arrangements;
(viii) The use of the privilege granted under the trade
mark system to restrict unduly the recipient s
activities;
(ix) Obligations to use a particular trade mark or
trade name or to mention the supplier's name
together with the technology acquired;
(x) Restrictions on obtaining competing or complemen
tary technology from other suppliers with regard
to the sale of manufacture of products involving
trade marks of trade names;
(xi) Prohibitions or limitations of any type onthe
export of products manufactured on the basis of
the technology supplied including restrictions
on exports to certain markets, permission to
export only to certain markets, and requirements
of prior approval of the supplier for exports
and prices of exported products;
(xii) Restrictions on the freedom of the recipient to
enter into sales or representation agreements
related to similar technologies or products;
(xiii) Requiring the recipient of technology to give
exclusive sales or representation rights to the
supplier, with due regard to sub-contracting
arrangements;
(xiv) Reservation of the right by the supplier to fix
the sale or resale price of the products manu
factured ;
(xv) Requirements prohibiting or restricting exports
by the recipient of goods covered by a trade
mark arrangement;
(xvi) Tying the supply of imports of a product bearing
a particular trade mark to the trade mark owner
and thereby prohibiting imports from a third
party or another licensee;
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(xvii) Regulations which restrict or subject to approval
by the supplier, the publicity or advertisement
to be carried out by the recipient;
(xviii) Obliging the recipient to convert technology pay
ments into capital stock;
(xix) Continuation of payments for unused or unexploited
technology;
(xx) Requiring the acceptance of additional technology
not desired by the recipient or needed in the
recipient country, such as in consultancy services,
international sub-contracting, turn-key projects
and various forms of package arrangements, as a
condition for obtaining the technology required.
(xxi) Tying the imports of inputs, equipment and spare
parts and technical and managerial personnel to
a specific external source, and thus making it
possible for enterprises to charge higher than
normal prices for them;
(xxii) Requiring payments by the recipient enterprise
for technology imported by the enterprise under
earlier arrangements or already available in the
country;
(xxiii) Increased rates of payments imposed by the tech
nology supplier upon the technology recipient
for output earmarked for export, vis-a-yis do-
mestic sales, except in cases where such dif-
ferential rates are in the interest of the
recipient country;
(xxiv) Charging fixed minimum royalty payments irres
pective of production performance and/or increas
ing royalty rates progressively with the rise in
the scale of output;
(xxv) Charging royalties or fees for know-how or tech
nical assistance in a cumulative way on parts
as well as on the final product, so that the
total charges are in fact larger than if the
same percentages were applied on a net value-
added basis;
(xxvi) Limitations of the research and development (R&D)
policy and activities of the recipient enterprise;
(xxvii) Grant-back provisions establishing a unilateral
flow of technical information and improvements
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from the technology recipient without reciprocal
obligations from the technology supplier;
fcxviii) Requirements to use personnel designated by the
technology suppliers, beyond the period sufficient
for the training of the recipient's personnel, or
limitations in the use of personnel of recipient
country;
(xxvix) Requirements by the supplier, except in manage
ment contracts, to participate in the management
decisions of the recipient enterprise;
(xxx) Obligation upon the recipient to purchase future
inventions and improvements in the technology
from the original supplier;
(xxxi) Limitations upon the access of the recipient to
new technological developments and improvements
related to the technology supplied;
(xxxii) Restriction upon the recipient from adapting the
imported technology to local conditions and in
novating on the supplied technology;
fcxxiii) Obligation upon the recipient to introduce un
necessary design changes and new material
specifications imposed by the technology sup
plier;
(xxxiv) Recipient's undertaking not to contest the
validity of the patents involved;
(xxxv) Unduly long duration of contractual agreements
or arrangements;
(xxxvi) Restricting the field of use of the subject mat
ter of a patent and of any unpatented know-how
license, related to the working of the patent;
fcxxvii) The charging of royalties on patents and other
industrial property rights not registered in the
recipient's countries;
(xxxviii) The charging of royalties on patents and other
industrial property rights after their expira
tion, termination or invalidation;
(xxxix) Exempting the supplier from any liability conse
quent upon defects in the goods produced by the
recipient with the help of the technology ac
quired;
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(xl) Other limitations having adverse effects on the
recipient and imposed as a condition for obtain
ing the technology required.
4.3 States shall prohibit or otherwise control restrictive
business clauses or practices in transfer of technology
transactions. These provisions might include the ways
and means for controlling and the establishment of general
or specific exemptions in cases of public interest.
4.4 Horizontal cartel activities among technology suppliers
involving restrictions on territory, quantity, prices
and customers, having adverse effects on the transfer of
technology, shall not be utilized including, inter alia,
the following:
(i) Import cartels;
(ii) Rebate cartels and other price fixing arrange
ments ;
(iii) Rational export cartels;
(iv) International cartels which allocate markets or
control exports or imports;
(v) Private and semi-official agreements on certain
standards in developed countries;
(vi) Specialization and rationalization cartels lead
ing to a dominant position.
Chapter VI
SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
6.1 Taking into consideration the economic, financial and
technological position of enterprises of developing
countries, the governments of developed countries shall
grant, or by every means available ensure that their
8.9
technology supplying firms grant special treatment to
enterprises of developing countries in their technology
transfer arrangements. Measures to this end shall in
clude, inter alia:
(i) Preferential tax treatment in the country of the
technology supplier of income arising from tech
nology transfer arrangements to developing coun
tries;
(ii) Preferential arrangements ensuring that the in
dustrial property rights granted to a patent
holder in technology supplying countries should
not be used by him to restrict imports of pro
ducts from developing countries;
(iii) Untying of credits and granting of credits on
terms more favorable than the usual commercial
terms for financing the acquisition of capital
and intermediate goods in connection with tech
nology transactions;
(iv) Fiscal and other incentives to the technology
exporting enterprises in developed countries for
encouraging the adaptation of their R&D activi
ties to conditions and factor endowments pre
vailing in developing countries;
(v) Fiscal and other incentives to the technology
exporting enterprise for encouraging the develop
ment of technological capabilities of enterprises
in developing countries, including special train
ing as required by the recipient;
(vi) Extending or strengthening assistance for the
establishment of national regional and/or inter
national institutions, including technology
transfer centres, to help the developing coun
tries to obtain their technological requirements
for the establishment, construction and opera
tion of plants under the most favorable terms
and conditions;
(vii) Facilitating the access of enterprises of deve
loping countries to technology covered by
industrial property rights held by governments
of developed countries.
6.2 The special treatment to developing countries shall be
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extended on a non-discriminatory basis, while giving
particular consideration to the special problems and
conditions of the least developed among the developing
countries.
Chapter VIII
APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
8.1 Technology transfer arrangements shall be governed, with
regard to their validity, performance and interpretation,
by the laws of the technology-receiving country.
8.2 The technology-receiving country shall exercise legal
jurisdiction over the settlement of disputes pertaining
to transfer of technology arrangements between the par
ties concerned.
8.3 If the laws applicable to the technology transfer arrange
ments do not exclude recourse to arbitration in; this field
and the parties concerned agree to submit their possible
disputes to arbitration, such disputes will be settled
according to the procedures agreed upon by the parties
concerned.
8.4 Any dispute among the states with regard to the inter
pretation of the present Code shall be settled through
consultation and through such conciliation and arbitra
tion procedures as may be established by the states con
cerned.
APPENDIX C
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY a/
Objectives and Principles
While technology transfer mechanisms, including those in
volving international technology trade transactions, may
differ according to political and economic systems and
levels of development, the access to modern technology
represents one of the basic conditions for socio-economic
development of all countries and the maintenance of world
peace and increase in over-all prosperity. It is con
sidered of vital importance to establish and implement
international rules that would enable every country to
participate on an equal footing in the international tech
nology transfer. Therefore, the present Code of Conduct
on Transfer of Technology has the following objectives
and principles:
(i) to establish general equitable rules of behavior
in the international technology markets taking
into consideration particularly the justified
needs of developing countries and legitimate
rights and objectives of technology producers and
suppliers and technology recipients;
(ii) to make clear the distinction between proprietary
technology and freely available technology and
reflect this distinction in terms and conditions
of technological transactions;
(iii) to foster the expansion of international trade in
proprietary technology on terms mutually beneficial
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to suppliers and recipients by eliminating restric
tive technology trade practices and regulating
monopolistic rights accruing to some proprietary
technology owners for the purpose of assuring the
strengthening of the negotiating power of develop
ing countries;
(iv) to ensure fair pricing of technology trade trans
actions, by assigning all direct and indirect costs
to the recipients and profits to the suppliers, and
taking into consideration, inter alia, the duration
of a contract and the dynamics of technological
progress;
(v) to introduce as a minimum the most favoured licen
see clause in the international technology trade
transactions involving developing countries;
(vi) to expand free flow of non-proprietary technology on
a non-discriminatory basis and through appropriate
channels and mechanisms to suit the requirements
of developing countries;
(vii) to ensure the responsibility of suppliers and
recipients to adapt technological trade transac
tions and flows of freely available technology to
factor proportions of the countries with different
development levels and to their local development
needs and absorptive capacity;
(viii) to increase the contribution of technology, under
specially favourable conditions, for the solution
of pressing social problems in developed and deve
loping countries; and
(ix) to ensure that technological transactions entail
the strengthening of local technological capa- ^
bility of developing countries, which would permit
their indigenous technological advancement for the
purpose of diminishing gradually their technologi
cal dependence upon the outside world and assuring
their increasing participation in world technology
production and trade.
II. Scope of Application
2. For the purpose of this Code of Conduct the term 'tech
nology transfer,1 covers any kind of transfer of proprie
tary or freely available technology, independently from
93
its legal form. It includes, inter alia, the following:
(i) licensing agreements covering patents, investors'
certificates utility models and industrial designs
as well as trade marks, service names, and trade
names transferred together with proprietary or
freely available technology;
(ii) licensing agreements covering the provision of know-
how and technical expertise in the form of plans,
diagrams, models, instructions, guides, formula
tions, specifications, and involving personnel
training;
(iii) agreements covering provision of basic or detailed
engineering designs for the installation and opera
tion of plant and equipment and for the production
of goods and services;
(iv) purchase of machinery, equipment, intermediate
goods and raw materials, insofar as they are part
of transactions involving technology transfer;
(v) industrial and technical co-operation agreements of
any kind including international sub-contracting as
well as provision of management and marketing ser
vices ; and
(vi) technology transactions associated with the estab
lishment and operation of wholly owned subsidiaries
or affiliates and of joint ventures with various
degrees of participation.
3. The provision of the Code of Conduct apply to all trans
actions covering transfer of technology regardless of the
parties involved whether private capital, state or regional,
or international institutions. These provisions should be
considered as minimum standards achieving adequate condi
tions of technology transfer with regard to the develop
ment possibilities of developing countries.
V. Guarantees
8. The supplier shall guarantee that:
(i) the technology acquired is in itself suitable for
9.4
the manufacture of products covered by the agree
ment;
(ii) the content of the technology transferred is in it
self full and complete for the purposes of the
agreement;
(iii) the technology obtained will in itself be capable
of achieving a predetermined level of production
under the conditions specified in the agreement;
(iv) national personnel shall be adequately trained in
the operation of the technology to be acquired and
in the management of the enterprises;
(v) the technology is the most adequate to meet the
particular technological requirements of the re
cipient given to suppliers technological capabili
ties;
(vi) the recipient shall be informed and supplied with
all improvements on the techniques in question
during the lifetime of the agreement;
(vii) where the recipient of the technology has no other
technological alternative than acquiring capital
goods, intermediate inputs and/or raw materials
from, or selling his output to, the technology sup
plier or any source designated by him, the prices
of the articles shall be consonant with current
international price levels;
(viii) for a certain period of time the supplier shall
guarantee to provide spare parts, components, and
servicing of the technology without additional
charges for maintaining this guarantee;
(ix) all transfer of technology arrangements should
include a provision by which if the licensor grants
more favourable terms to a second licensee these
terms will be automatically extended to the first
licensee.
9. The recipient shall guarantee that:
(i) the acquired technology will be used as specified
in the contract;
(ii) all legitimate payments as specified in the con
tract shall be made to the technology suppliers;
(iii) the technical secrets as defined in the contract
shall be honoured;
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(iv) the quality standards of the products specified
in the contract will be reached and maintained
where the contract includes the use of the sup
plier's trade mark, trade name, or similar iden
tification of good will;
(v) the socio-economic conditions and needs of the
country of the recipient have been taken into
account while entering into a technology transfer
agreement.
VI. Action by Governments
10. Governments of developing countries shall, if they have
not already done so and consistent with their develop
ment objectives, and social and economic policies, take
the necessary legislative and administrative measures to
enforce the application of the standards on transfer of
technology as set out in Chapters III, IV and V of the
present Code.
11. Governments of developed countries, both with market and
socialist economies, recognize the rights of developing
countries to take the necessary measure set out in the
preceding paragraph and shall accept the standards set
out in this Code, and encourage the transfer of technology
to developing countries based on these standards.
VIII. Laws for Jurisdiction and Settlement
of Disputes
12. The following provisions shall govern the procedures for
jurisdiction and settlement of disputes:
(i) the technology transfer agreements between tech
nology suppliers and recipients from different
countries should be subject, with regard to
their scope, enforcement and interpretation, to
the laws of the technology-receiving country;
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(ii) in the event of a dispute between a supplier of
technology and a recipient of technology, legal
jurisdiction for settlement of the dispute shall
reside in the courts of the technology-receiving
country;
(iii) if the laws applicable to the technology transfer
agreements do not exclude recourse to arbitration
in this field and the parties concerned agree in
their contracts to submit their possible disputes
to arbitration, such disputes will be settled
according to the procedures set out in the contract;
(iv) in order to permit the solution of technical dis
putes at an early stage and thus minimize the need
for legal arbitration or judicial settlement of
disputes, parties may insert in their arbitration
procedures provisions whereby disputes of a tech
nical nature would be submitted as soon as possible
after they arise to impartial technical experts ap
pointed in a way acceptable to all parties con
cerned.
VIII. International Organizations
13. The international organizations, within the limits of
their competence, shall assist the developing countries
in the application of the standards of the Code on Trans
fer of Technology.
IX. Measures According Special Treatment to
Developing Countries
14. In addition to the provisions of Chapters, III, IV and V,
transfer of technology to the developing countries shall
include forms of preferential treatment designed to take
account of the weaker position of their enterprises in
the technological, financial or managerial field. To
this end, governments of developed countries shall,
by every means available, ensure that their technology-
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supplying firms grant preferential measures in trans
actions involving the transfer of technology to develop
ing countries. Such measures shall include, inter alia:
(i) phasing out of down payments, or including such
payments as part of royalties on production, on
a soft basis;
(ii) scaling down of the changes for technology in
proportion to the size of the recipient's market;
(iii) untying of credits for the purchase, from the
most competitive source, of capital goods, spare
parts and intermediate components;
(iv) rebates on imports of raw materials, equipment
and components for licensed production;
(v) development of local technological capability and
R&D by technology suppliers with affiliated com
panies in developing countries;
(vi) development of the R&D and technological capa
bility of the recipient firm.
(vii) adapting the technology to be transferred to make
it appropriate to conditions and factor endowment
of the recipient country;
(viii) transferring to the recipient firm non-proprietary
technology which the supplier may possess in the
field of activity of the recipient;
(ix) sub-licensing rights under special concessional
terms.
X. Implementation and Revision
15. The Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology should be
the object of a multilateral legal instrument to be in
ternationally negotiated and agreed upon, and to become
binding on signatories once the conditions for its entry
into force, to be established in the legal instrument
itself, are fully met. In addition, such instrument
98
should further define the necessary measures for the full
implementation of, and full compliance with, the Code of
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